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STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 




                                                          Petitioner, 
 
   -and-                                                 CASE NO. TIA2017-012 
 
MTA BUS COMPANY, 
 




COLLERAN, O’HARA & MILLS, LLP (DENIS ENGEL, ESQ., of counsel) for 
Petitioner 
 
PROSKAUER ROSE, LLP (NEIL H. ABRAMSON, ESQ., of counsel) for 
Respondent 
 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 
This matter comes to us by reason of a report and recommendation of the 
Director of Conciliation (Director) regarding a petition for interest arbitration filed by the 
Transport Workers Union, Local 106, Transit Supervisors Organization (TSO) under 
§209.5 of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) and §205.15 of our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules) with respect to an impasse in contract negotiations between TSO 
and the MTA Bus Company (MTA).   
 In his report and recommendation, the Director concludes that a voluntary 
resolution of the contract negotiations between TSO and the MTA cannot be effected 
and recommends that the impasse be referred to a public interest arbitration panel.   
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 The MTA has not filed an objection to the Director’s report and recommendation 
pursuant to §205.15(b) of the Rules. 
 Following our review of the Director’s report and recommendation, we hereby 
certify that a voluntary resolution of the contract negotiations between TSO and the 
MTA cannot be effected and we, therefore, refer the impasse involving these parties to 
a public interest arbitration panel. 
 SO ORDERED. 
DATED: August 31, 2017 
  Albany, New York 
             
 
                     
 
 
               
  STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
_________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
NEW YORK STATE CORRECTIONAL 






CASE NO. U-31734 
-and- 
 
STATE OF NEW YORK (OFFICE OF PARKS,  








SHEEHAN, GREENE, GOLDERMAN & JACQUES, LLP (ERIN N. PARKER of  
counsel), for Charging Party 
 
MICHAEL N. VOLFORTE, GENERAL COUNSEL (LYNN HOMES LYON of 
counsel), for Respondent 
 
 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the New York State Correctional 
Officers and Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (NYSCOPBA), and a cross-exception 
filed by the State of New York (Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation) 
(State), to a decision and order of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).1  In her decision, 
the ALJ dismissed NYSCOPBA’s improper practice charge, which alleged that the State 
violated § 209-a.1 (d) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
unilaterally ceasing to provide Forest Ranger Michael Carlson with a State-owned take-
home vehicle.   
                                                     
1 48 PERB ¶ 4545 (2015). 
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EXCEPTIONS 
 NYSCOPBA filed three exceptions to the ALJ’s decision.  First, NYSCOPBA 
argues that the ALJ erroneously found that the assignment of a take-home vehicle was 
a conditional benefit.  Second, even assuming that the assignment was a conditional 
benefit, NYSCOPBA argues that the State did not demonstrate that its actions were 
consistent with the stated conditions.  Finally, NYSCOPBA argues that the ALJ 
erroneously imputed knowledge of a document entitled “Overnight Vehicle Assignment 
agreement” to it.  
 The State requests that the Board affirm the ALJ’s decision but, in the alternative, 
argues that the charge should be dismissed as untimely filed.  
 Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties’ 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ.  
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ’s decision, and are discussed here only as 
far as is necessary to address the exceptions.  The State assigned a State-owned 
vehicle to Carlson in 1999, when Carlson was assigned to Minnewaska State Park.  The 
vehicle was used in the performance of Carlson’s job duties, and Carlson was permitted 
to take the vehicle home so that he could return to the Park in the event of emergencies 
after hours.2  
On or about December 14, 2011, Carlson was notified by David Herrick, Major of 
the Hudson Valley District Park Police, that he would no longer be assigned a take-
home vehicle, and Carlson has not been assigned such a vehicle since January 1, 
                                                     
2 Joint Exhibit 1.  
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2012.3   
A document entitled “Overnight Vehicle Assignment agreement,” signed by 
Carlson on April 9, 2008, was introduced into evidence.4  The document included 
provisions stating, “I acknowledge that the State has made the vehicles [sic] available 
for my use for the performance of my official duties only and that the subject vehicle 
may not be used for personal business,” “I acknowledge that the vehicle has been made 
available to me to assist me in the performance of my duties and to enable me to 
respond to emergency calls,” and “I acknowledge that the State may at any time elect to 
terminate this agreement.  The State will provide me with notice of this determination.”    
Carlson testified the “Overnight Vehicle Assignment agreement,” was left in his 
work mailbox in April of 2008.5  Upon receipt, Carlson spoke to his supervisor, Park 
Manager Eric Humphrey, about the document and asked whether Humphrey had 
received it as well.6  According to Carlson, Humphrey’s response was that he had also 
received the document and that Carlson needed to “sign it and send it back.”7  Carlson 
stated that he also asked Humphrey where the document came from and Humphrey 
indicated that he did not know.8   
After his conversation with Humphrey, Carlson filled out the document and 
signed it with a “UD” initialed next to his signature to indicate that he was signing the 
document “under duress” because he did not agree with the terms of the vehicle use 
                                                     
3 Id.  
4 Id., Exhibit A. 
5 Transcript, p. 27.   
6 Transcript, p. 28.   
7 Id.  
8 Id. 
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articulated therein.9  According to Carlson, the terms were different than those he 
agreed to in 1999, when he received the vehicle.10  Carlson never received an executed 
copy of the agreement.11 
Carlson’s title, Forest Ranger, is included in the Securities Services Unit, 
represented by NYSCOPBA.  Since 2002, Carlson has been chief sector steward of the 
NYSCOPBA bargaining unit.12  As chief sector steward, Carlson testified that his 
“position is to represent the park rangers, conservation park workers, park security 
officers and forest rangers” of the State’s Department of Environmental Conservation.13  
He also testified that as chief sector steward he could be involved in improper practice 
charges, the contract grievance process, and discussions of labor-management issues 
in labor-management meetings.14  Carlson never notified any other officials of 
NYSCOPBA of the “Overnight Vehicle Assignment agreement” that he signed in April 
2008.15  Discontinuing the take-home status of the vehicle assigned to Carlson was not 
negotiated with NYSCOPBA.16 
DISCUSSION  
The Court of Appeals has recently acknowledged and endorsed our decisions 
holding that “employee use of an employer-owned vehicle for transportation to and from 
work is an economic benefit and a mandatorily negotiable term and condition of 
                                                     
9 Id.   
10 Transcript, p. 29.   
11 Transcript, pp. 30, 40.  
12 Transcript, p. 38.   
13 Transcript, p. 39. 
14 Transcript, pp. 39-40. 
15 Transcript, pp. 30, 40.  
16 Id.  
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employment; therefore a public employer may not unilaterally discontinue a past 
practice of providing its employees with this benefit.”17  In order to establish an 
enforceable past practice, the charging party must demonstrate that the practice was 
unequivocal and continued uninterrupted for a period of time sufficient under the 
circumstances to give rise to a reasonable expectation among the affected unit 
members that the practice would continue.18 
We agree with the ALJ that the State’s revocation of Carlson’s vehicle in 2012 
was consistent with its right to “at any time” terminate the assignment pursuant to the 
2008 “Overnight Vehicle Assignment agreement,” and we find that NYSCOPBA failed to 
demonstrate that revocation of the vehicle was inconsistent with an enforceable past 
practice.   
Like the ALJ, we do not treat the 2008 document as an agreement cognizable 
under the Act.19  Rather, the 2008 document changed the terms of the vehicle 
assignment practice as it related to Carlson.  The 2008 document clearly and 
unequivocally stated that the State could “at any time elect to terminate this agreement” 
and hence to revoke Carlson’s vehicle assignment.  The 2008 document did not impose 
                                                     
17 Town of Islip v Pub Empl Relations Bd, 23 NY3d 482, 491, 47 PERB ¶ 7002 (2014).  
The Board has long held that the provision of employer-owned vehicles to employees 
for personal use is an economic benefit and, therefore, a mandatory subject of 
negotiation.  See, e.g., County of Nassau, 38 PERB ¶ 3005, 3014 (2005), citing County 
of Nassau, 35 PERB ¶ 3036 (2002), County of Monroe and Sheriff, 33 PERB ¶ 3044, 
3118 (2000), and County of Nassau, 26 PERB ¶ 3040, 3068 confirmed sub nom. 
County of Nassau v PERB, 215 AD2d 381, 28 PERB ¶ 7011 (2d Dept 1995).   
18 Chenango Forks Cent School Dist, 40 PERB ¶ 3012, 3046-3047 (2007), confirmed 
sub nom. Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist v New York State Pub Empl Relations Bd, 95 
AD3d 1479, 45 PERB ¶ 7006 (3d Dept 2012), confd, 21 NY3d 255, 46 PERB ¶ 7008 
(2013). 
19 48 PERB ¶ 4545, at 4650 n. 43.  
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any substantive or procedural requirements on the State prior to revoking Carlson’s 
vehicle assignment, but instead allowed the State to withdraw the benefit of a take-
home vehicle at any time and without any justification.  Given the terms of the 
“Overnight Vehicle Assignment agreement,” we agree with the ALJ that, after receiving 
and signing the document in April of 2008, Carlson could not have had a reasonable 
expectation that he would always be assigned a take-home vehicle.20  
We note that the State’s unilateral change to the terms of the vehicle assignment 
to Carlson in 2008 appear to have been made in violation of the State’s obligation to 
negotiate prior to changing this mandatory subject of bargaining.  However, neither 
Carlson nor NYSCOPBA filed an improper practice charge or otherwise formally 
challenged the imposition of new terms in 2008.  The State’s actions in 2008 took place 
well outside the four-month limitations period set forth in § 204.1 (a) of our Rules of 
Procedure and, thus, the lawfulness of the State’s action in imposing the “Overnight 
Vehicle Assignment agreement” is not before us.21     
                                                     
20 See Bd of Ed of City School District of City of New York, 42 PERB ¶ 3019, 3069 
(2009) (“[w]here . . . there is evidence establishing that the contours of the practice 
include an employer's unfettered discretion to continue or to modify the practice 
consistent with a prior explicit written reservation . . . there would be no enforceable 
practice”). 
Given that Carlson could not have had a reasonable expectation of being 
assigned a take-home vehicle since April 2008, it is immaterial whether the vehicle 
assignment was conditional prior to that time.  
21 NYSCOPBA has not presented any evidence that the State, through its conduct, 
induced it to delay filing a charge until the filing period has passed.  See, e.g., County of 
Onondaga, 12 PERB ¶ 3035, 3065 (1979), confirmed sub nom. County of Onondaga v 
New York State Pub Empl Relations Bd, 77 AD2d 783, 13 PERB ¶ 7011 (4th Dept 
1980); Great Neck Water Pollution Control District, 27 PERB ¶ 3057, 3134 (1994).   
An improper practice charge alleging a unilateral change in a policy of practice in 
violation of § 209-a.1 (d) of the Act can be filed either within four months of notification 
of the change or within four months of implementation of the change.  County of 
Case No. U-31734 
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NYSCOPBA argues that the State never informed it of the change that occurred 
in April 2008 when the “Overnight Vehicle Assignment agreement” was given to Carlson 
and, therefore, that NYSCOPBA never had notice of the change.  We affirm the ALJ’s 
finding that Carlson’s knowledge of the 2008 document was properly imputed to 
NYSCOPBA.   
As the ALJ found, Carlson was a chief sector steward at the time he received the 
2008 document.  Carlson testified that his duties in that position included representing 
other employees in the unit, and that he also had labor relations responsibilities for 
NYSCOPBA that included involvement in labor-management meetings, contract 
grievances, and improper practice proceedings.  We agree with the ALJ that Carlson 
had sufficient representational duties and responsibilities to impute knowledge of the 
2008 document to NYSCOPBA itself.22  Moreover, Carlson was clearly aware that the 
2008 document changed the terms of his vehicle assignment.  Carlson expressly 
testified that he wrote “UD” next to his signature to indicate that he signed the document 
“under duress” because he believed it was different from the terms he agreed to when 
he was first assigned a vehicle in 1999.   
In sum, we find that the State’s revocation of Carlson’s vehicle in 2012 was 
consistent with its practice, as set forth in the 2008 “Overnight Vehicle Assignment 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Livingston, 43 PERB ¶ 3018, 3072 (2010); Middle Country Teachers Assn, 21 PERB     
¶ 3012, 3025-3026 (1988).  Here, the new policy was not merely announced but 
implemented in 2008, as Carlson, both the chief sector steward and the affected 
employee, was required to acknowledge the newly discretionary nature of the condition 
upon which he received the vehicle.  See, eg, City of Oswego, 23 PERB ¶ 3007, 3018 
(1990).     
22 Board of Ed of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York, 42 PERB ¶ 3026, 3104 
(2009); Ganada Cent Sch Dist, 17 PERB ¶ 3095, 3147 (1984).  
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agreement.”  Accordingly, we affirm the ALJ’s decision to dismiss NYSCOPBA’s charge 
alleging that the State violated § 209-a.1 (d) of the Act.  We find it unnecessary to 
address the State’s exceptions concerning the timeliness of the charge.  
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the improper practice charge is dismissed. 
DATED:  August 31, 2017 
               Albany, New York 
     
     
  STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
______________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NOS.  
U-33471 & U-33999 
- and – 
 
STATE OF NEW YORK  





BARRY MARKMAN, for Charging Party 
 
MICHAEL N. VOLFORTE, ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL (TERESA A. 
NEWCOMB of counsel), for Respondent 
 
 
 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the New York State Public 
Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF) to a decision and order of an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing PEF’s improper practice charge.1  PEF’s dismissed charge 
alleged that the State of New York (Office of Medicaid Inspector General) (State or 
OMIG) violated § 209-a.1 (d) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
failing to issue parking placards in 2014 to Investigators represented by PEF and by 
issuing a new policy regarding the use of parking placards.   
EXCEPTIONS 
 PEF filed five exceptions to the ALJ’s decision arguing, in essence, that the 
provision of parking placards was an economic benefit and a mandatory subject of 
bargaining and that OMIG’s unilateral decision to cease issuing placards to 
                                            
1 49 PERB ¶ 4517 (2016). 
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Investigators violated the Act.  OMIG supports the decision of the ALJ and contends 
that no basis has been demonstrated for reversal.   
 Based on our review of the record and our consideration of the parties’ 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ’s decision and dismiss the charge. 
FACTS 
 The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ’s decision and are discussed here only as 
far as is necessary to address the exceptions.  Prior to 2014, it was the policy of OMIG 
to annually provide Investigators in its Division of Medicaid Investigations (DMI) with 
New York City parking placards for use in conducting investigations in the field.  The 
placards could be placed in Investigators’ personal vehicles when they were conducting 
field work.2  The placards were to be used for official OMIG business only, and the 
policy governing their use stated that the placards were “not for personal benefit, 
including, but not limited to, securing a parking spot close to OMIG’s NYC offices on 
days when the staff member assigned the placard does not intend to go into the field.”3  
The parking placards remained in the possession of Investigators once they were 
distributed to them.4  
 On February 19, 2014, Nancy Conroy, OMIG Director of Bureau Operations 
Management, sent an e-mail that stated that she would be distributing parking placards 
for use in 2014 on February 25 and 26, 2014.5  The distribution did not take place on 
those days, however, and on March 5, 2014, Anna Coschignano, then OMIG’s Director 
of the Division of Medicaid, sent an e-mail to DMI staff that read, in relevant part, 
“[a]gency 2014 placards will not be issued until a policy is approved which takes into 
                                            
2 Tr, at pp. 15, 30, 73-75.  
3 Charging Party’s Ex 3. 
4 Tr, at pp. 27, 32, 81-82.  
5 Charging Party’s Ex 1. 
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account monitoring of the placards, internal controls and the usage of government 
vehicles with agency placards.”6  According to Coschignano, the reason for developing 
the new policy was that she was advised that three employees were improperly using 
the placards for commuting purposes.7    
 On October 6, 2014, OMIG amended its policy governing the use of parking 
placards.8  Investigators were no longer to be issued a parking placard to permanently 
keep in their possession.  Instead, Investigators may be issued a parking placard only 
when a state vehicle is not available, and the parking placard must be returned to the 
Parking Placard Administrator promptly upon completion of the assignment for which it 
was signed out.9  OMIG did not negotiate with PEF prior to issuing the new policy, and 
Investigators never received a 2014 parking placard to keep in their permanent custody.   
 Two Investigators testified that having a permanent parking placard for use in 
their personal vehicles was useful for their job because it made it easier to find parking, 
avoided the need to “feed the meter,” and sometimes shortened the time spent driving 
to and from investigations.10 
DISCUSSION 
 Free parking is a mandatory subject of negotiation because it is an economic 
benefit to employees.11  PEF relies on this well-established principle to argue that 
provision of the parking placards to Investigators here was a mandatory subject that 
                                            
6 Charging Party’s Ex 4. 
7 Tr, at p. 201.  
8 Charging Party’s Ex 6. 
9 Id.  
10 See Tr, at pp. 26-28, 31 (Doran); pp. 73, 75-79, 95 (Murphy).  
11 Board of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York, 44 PERB ¶ 3003, 3031 
(2011), confirmed sub nom. City of New York v New York State Pub Empl Relations Bd, 
103 AD3d 145, 46 PERB ¶ 7001 (3d Dept 2012); County of Nassau (Dept of Drug and 
Alcohol Addiction), 14 PERB ¶ 3083, 3144 (1981), affirmed sub nom. County of Nassau 
v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 87 AD2d 1006, 15 PERB ¶ 7025 (2d Dept 1982); 
State of New York, 6 PERB ¶ 3005, 3021 (1973).  
Case Nos. U-33471 & U-33999  4 
 
could not be unilaterally changed by OMIG.  We, like the ALJ, reject this argument.  
 It is undisputed that the parking placards were issued to Investigators to assist in 
their performance of their job duties when Investigators conducted investigations in the 
field.  Unlike the parking permits at issue in Board of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the 
City of New York,12 parking placards here were not a personal benefit that allowed 
employees the opportunity to park near the buildings where they worked.  Nor were 
Investigators permitted to use the parking placard for other personal use, such as 
parking their personal vehicles near their homes when not on duty.  
 Prior to 2014, when Investigators traveled into the field, they always had the 
option of taking their personal vehicle and using the parking placard to gain access to 
restricted parking spaces and to avoid paying meter fees.  Investigators could also 
travel to and from field sites directly from their home, without the need to first travel to 
the office.  After OMIG changed its parking placard policy, Investigators no longer had 
permanent custody of a parking placard.  Investigators could still receive the parking 
privileges, but only if they used one of the fleet vehicles owned by the State.13  Thus, 
Investigators no longer had the option of using their personal vehicles or traveling 
directly to and from field sites.14  Employees testified that this made their jobs harder to 
do and increased the time spent performing investigations.    
 We find that the provision of parking placards in these circumstances is not a 
mandatory subject of bargaining because the placards involve the manner and means 
                                            
12 44 PERB ¶ 3003, at 3031.  
13 Investigators could receive a parking placard for their personal vehicles, but only if a 
fleet vehicle was not available, and Investigators had to return the placard immediately 
after finishing their assignment.  
14 This description of the new policy is somewhat simplified.  OMIG’s new policy did 
provide that Investigators could receive a placard for their personal vehicles if a State 
vehicle was not available.  However, Investigators could not keep these placards 
permanently and still had to travel to the office to receive the placard.  
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by which OMIG renders services to the public and the equipment that Investigators will 
utilize in performing their job functions.  The parking placards do not provide an 
economic benefit to employees – Investigators were not responsible for paying for 
parking while working in the field either before or after the change in OMIG’s policy.  
Unlike in Board of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York,15 Investigators did 
not previously receive a personal benefit from the authorized use of the placards, such 
as the opportunity to park their personal vehicles near their office for free.  The placards 
instead were only to be used while Investigators were performing official job duties 
away from the office.  The sole purpose of the placards was to facilitate the 
performance of Investigators’ jobs, and OMIG did not encourage or condone the use of 
placards for personal use.16  Indeed, the change to the placard policy came about when 
OMIG discovered that some Investigators may have been improperly using the placards 
to obtain a personal benefit.   
 Investigators may have found it more efficient and/or convenient to perform their 
job duties when they had a permanent placard in their possession for use in their 
personal vehicles.  However, the decision not to provide placards but to instead require 
Investigators to use fleet vehicles owned by the State in performing their job functions is 
fundamentally a decision about the manner in which OMIG provides services to the 
public and about the equipment that Investigators will utilize in performing their job 
functions.  An employer has a managerial prerogative to determine the manner and 
means by which services are provided.  Because the selection of equipment “involves 
                                            
15 44 PERB ¶ 3003, at 3031.  
16 Compare Town of Islip, 44 PERB ¶ 3014, 3051-3052 (2011) (finding town could not 
discontinue past practice of allowing personal use of assigned cars where town knew of 
practice, even though such use was inconsistent with preexisting rule), confirmed and 
remanded as to remedy sub nom. Matter of Town of Islip v Pub Empl Relations Bd, 23 
NY3d 482, 47 PERB ¶ 7006 (2014), remanded to ALJ, 48 PERB ¶ 3002 (2015).  
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the manner and means by which [an employer] serves its constituency,” a determination 
as to the equipment to be used in the course of an employee’s job duties is not 
mandatorily negotiable under the Act.17  As a result, we find that OMIG did not violate 
the Act by failing to issue 2014 parking placards and issuing a new policy regarding the 
use of parking placards.   
 We make no findings on whether OMIG had a duty to bargain over the impact of 
the changes to its parking placard policy.  Neither of the charges filed by PEF allege 
that OMIG has refused an impact bargaining demand from PEF, and no facts were 
introduced that pertain to this issue.18   
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the improper practice charge is dismissed. 
DATED:  August 31, 2017 
               Albany, New York 
     
 
 
                                            
17 City of New Rochelle, 10 PERB ¶ 3042, 3079 (1977).  See also Incorporated Village 
of Rockville Centre, 43 PERB ¶ 3030, 3112 (2010) (“an employer has the prerogative 
under the Act to determine the manner and means by which services are provided); 
County of Nassau, 38 PERB ¶ 3030, 3101 (2005) (“As a general principle, a public 
employer need not bargain about the manner in which it provides services to the public 
or about the equipment that its employees will utilize in performing their job functions”); 
City Sch Dist of the City of New Rochelle, 4 PERB ¶ 3060, 3706 (1971) (“the public 
employer . . . must determine the manner and means by which [] services are to be 
rendered”).   
18 See, eg, Lackawanna City Sch Dist, 28 PERB ¶ 3023, 3055 (1995).  
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Charging Party,         CASE NO. U-35549 
- and - 
 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC.,  
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 830, 
 
Respondent.       
__________________________________________                                                                                                    
 
SUSAN METZGER, pro se 
 
 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Susan Metzger to a decision of the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing her 
improper practice charge.1  In her initial charge, Metzger alleged that the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 830 (CSEA) 
violated § 209-a.2 (c) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) when, in 
September 2015, she converted from a part-time position to a full-time position at 
Nassau Community College (College) and did not receive the salary she was expecting 
because she was considered a “new hire.”  Specifically, Metzger alleged: 
I believe my union (CSEA 830 Local) has been irresponsible 
in protecting my interests with the modification to our 
contract . . . in April 2014.  This change has resulted in a 
financial hardship for me since September 18, 2015. 
  
 Finally, Metzger’s charge states that CSEA pursued clarification of how the 
                                            
1 50 PERB ¶ 4521 (2017).  
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contract would be applied to her with the employer after the contract was negotiated 
and prior to her taking the full-time position, resulting in a January 9, 2015 “MOA” that 
failed to remedy her concerns. 
 Metzger was advised that her charge was deficient because, inter alia, it 
appeared to be untimely.   
 In response, Metzger filed an amended charge with the Director on March 7, 
2017 which, with respect to the timeliness deficiency, states: 
I would…like to file a request for an exception in reference to 
one of the deficiencies. 
 
While the situation (contract modification) originally occurred 
in April 2014 and didn’t affect me financially until Sept. 2015 
when I accepted a full-time position at Nassau Community 
College, I have been working continuously since April 2014 
within the system with my union in an effort to rectify this 
situation.  However, at this point, I’m not confident the union 
will remedy it. 
 
 Metzger than reiterates the same information concerning the January 9, 2015 
MOA and states that, in December 2015, CSEA attempted to convince the College to 
“put [her] on higher step (sic) [in] the new schedule,” but those efforts were 
unsuccessful.  Finally, Metzger alleges that, in October 2016, she “thought [she] would 
try again” because the College had a different president.  According to Metzger, the 
College’s president denied her request via a letter, which she forwarded to CSEA.  On 
October 22, 2016, she received a responsive email from CSEA informing her that “there 
is really nowhere else to go with [her] situation.” 
 The Director found that Metzger’s amended charge failed to correct the 
deficiencies in her earlier charge, and she dismissed Metzger’s charge in full.  
 




 Metzger filed exceptions to the Director’s decision.  Metzger argues that she has 
been “working within the system” with CSEA “in the hope” that CSEA “would be able to 
rectify my difficult financial situation caused by the April 1, 2014 contract modification . . 
. .”2  Metzger argues that she promptly filed her charge after CSEA told her that, “as it 
stands, we have nowhere to go with this.”3  
 Based on our review of the record and our consideration of Metzger’s arguments, 
we affirm the Director’s decision and dismiss the charge.   
DISCUSSION 
 Section 204.1 (a) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) requires an improper 
practice charge to be filed within four months of when the charging party had actual or 
constructive knowledge of the conduct that forms the basis for the alleged improper 
practice.4  Here, Metzger’s allegation is that the terms of the contract have affected her 
adversely since September 2015.  We agree with the Director that Metzger knew by 
December 2015 that CSEA had attempted, unsuccessfully, to obtain an increase in 
Metzger’s salary.  Thus, Metzger’s charge, filed on February 6, 2017, concerns conduct 
that occurred well beyond the filing period set by our Rules.  We also agree with the 
Director that the fact that Metzger renewed her request to the College and to CSEA in 
                                            
2 Exceptions, at 1.  
3 Id.  
4 See, eg, District Council 37 (Bacchus), 50 PERB ¶ 3013, 3057-3058 (2017); UFT 
(Davis), 50 PERB ¶ 3014, 3059 (2017); New York State Thruway Auth, 40 PERB          
¶ 4533, 4595 (2007); Civil Service Employees Assn, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO, 28 PERB ¶ 3072, 3168, n. 4 (1995).   
October 2016 does not extend the filing period or revive her charge.5 
  Although the Board has found a respondent to be equitably estopped from 
asserting a timeliness defense where the respondent has, through its conduct, induced 
the charging party to delay filing a charge until the filing period has passed, that limited 
exception does not apply here, where there is no evidence that Metzger was 
detrimentally induced to delay filing a charge until the appropriate filing period had 
passed.6   
 Moreover, even if the charge were timely filed, we would affirm the Director’s 
dismissal of the charge on the merits.  The Board has often reaffirmed that “to establish 
a breach of the duty of fair representation under the Act, a charging party has the 
burden of proof to demonstrate that an employee organization’s conduct or actions are 
                                            
5 See, eg, NYCTA (Rosado), 37 PERB ¶ 3036, 3108 (2004); UFT (Paul), 23 PERB ¶ 
3038, 3077 (1990).  
 With her exceptions, Metzger filed a detailed timeline of her dealings with CSEA 
and the College.  Because these asserted facts were not presented to the Director, we 
do not consider them.  Our review of the Director's decision is limited to the record as it 
existed before her.  Mt. Pleasant Cottage UFSD, 50 PERB ¶ 3002, 3009, n. 12 (2017); 
CSEA (Josey), 49 PERB ¶ 3022, 3072 (2016); Smithtown Fire District, 28 PERB ¶ 
3060, 3135 (1995).  While in extraordinary circumstances such as the discovery of new 
evidence which could not reasonably have been discovered in proceedings before the 
Director, that principle may give way, no such extraordinary circumstances are present 
here.  CSEA (Reese), 25 PERB ¶ 3012, 3032, n. 1 (1992); New York City Transit Auth, 
23 PERB ¶ 3016, 3034 (1990); Buffalo Professional Firefighters Assn, Inc (Summers), 
22 PERB ¶ 3040, 3094 (1989). 
6 UFT (Davis), 50 PERB ¶ 3014,  (2017); DC 37 (Bacchus), 50 PERB ¶ 3013 (2017), 
citing County of Onondaga, 12 PERB ¶ 3035, 3065 (1979), confirmed sub nom. County 
of Onondaga v New York State Pub Empl Relations Bd, 77 AD2d 783, 13 PERB ¶ 7011 
(4th Dept 1980) (finding charge filed 14 months after announcement of change to be 
timely where employer detrimentally induced employee organization to delay filing a 
challenge to change pending employer’s actions aimed at such revocation); Great Neck 
Water Pollution Control District, 27 PERB ¶ 3057, 3134 (1994) (finding charge filed 
more than four months after announced change timely where employer led employee 
organization to believe that that change had been rescinded).  Cf. City of Elmira, 41 
PERB ¶ 3018, at 3086 (finding charging party failed to meet burden of demonstrating 
that respondent was equitably estopped from asserting timeliness defense).  
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arbitrary, discriminatory or founded in bad faith.”7   
  As we have previously explained, the courts have: 
reject[ed] the standard . . . that “irresponsible or grossly 
negligent” conduct may form the basis for a union' s breach 
of the duty of fair representation as not within the meaning of 
improper employee organization practices set forth in Civil 
Service Law § 209-a. An honest mistake resulting from 
misunderstanding or lack of familiarity with matters of 
procedure does not rise to the level of the requisite arbitrary, 
discriminatory or bad-faith conduct required to establish an 
improper practice by the union.8 
 
  Thus, “an employee’s mere disagreement with the tactics utilized or 
dissatisfaction with the quality or extent of representation does not constitute a breach 
of the duty of fair representation.”9 
  Metzger has neither expressly alleged nor provided any basis upon which we 
could conclude that the representation was tainted by any “arbitrary, discriminatory or 
bad-faith conduct” sufficient to violate the duty of fair representation, either when it 
agreed to the contract modification in April 2014 or in its subsequent dealings with 
Metzger as to how the contract was applied to her.  In her exceptions, Metzger argues 
that the 2014 contract modification adversely affected existing part-time employees 
planning to convert to full-time status.  Metzger states that the contract modification is 
                                            
7 District Council 37 (Calendario), 49 PERB ¶ 3015, 3060 (2016), quoting UFT (Cruz), 
48 PERB ¶ 3004, 3010, petition denied, Cruz v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 48 PERB 
¶ 7003 (Sup Ct NY Co 2015) (internal quotation and editing marks omitted), quoting 
UFT (Munroe), 47 PERB ¶ 3031, 3095 (2014), petition denied, 48 PERB ¶ 7002 (Sup Ct 
NY Co 2015) (quoting CSEA (Bienko), 47 PERB ¶ 3027, 3082-3083 (2014)); see 
District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Farrey), 41 PERB ¶ 3027, 3119 (2008). 
8 Id.; see also Cairo-Durham Teachers Assn, 47 PERB ¶ 3008, 3026 (2014) 
(quoting CSEA, L 1000 v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd (Diaz), 132 AD 2d 430, 432, 20 
PERB ¶ 7024, 7039 (3d Dept 1987), affd on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB       
¶ 7017 (1988)). 
9 Id. 
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“especially unjust” for these employees and that “[o]ne group should not have to bear 
such a large burden,”10 but such conclusory allegations are “insufficient to plead, let 
alone prove, a violation of the duty of fair representation.”11  Moreover, a bargaining 
agent does not breach its duty of fair representation by its good-faith agreement to 
terms in a collective bargaining agreement that benefit one group of members and not 
another.12 
  The charge does not set forth a claim that CSEA’s conduct was arbitrary, 
discriminatory or in bad faith as required to establish a breach of the Act.13  Accordingly, 
even if the improper practice charge were timely, it would be dismissed for failure to 
allege facts indicating a violation of the Act.  Based upon the foregoing, we deny the 
exceptions, affirm the decision of the Director, and dismiss the charge.  
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the improper practice charge is dismissed. 
DATED:  August 31, 2017 
               Albany, New York     
 
                                            
10 Exceptions, at 1 & 2.  
11 TWU (Waters), 49 PERB ¶ 3026, 3083 (2016), citing Elwood Teachers Alliance 
(Neithardt), 48 PERB ¶ 3020, 3067 (2015); UFT (Leon), 48 PERB ¶ 3016, 3056 (2015), 
(quoting UFT (Munroe), 47 PERB ¶ 3031, 3095 (2014)); confirmed sub nom. Munroe v 
NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 48 PERB ¶ 7002 (Sup Ct NY Co 2015) (citing PEF 
(Goonewardena), 27 PERB ¶ 3006 (1994)); see also UFT (Arredondo), 48 PERB          
¶ 3010, 3034 (2015). 
12 Elwood Teachers Alliance (Neithardt), 48 PERB ¶ 3020, at 3068; CSEA (Bienko), 47 
PERB ¶ 3027, 3082-3083 (2014); Tompkins County Dep Sheriff's Assn, Inc., 44 PERB 
¶3024, 3087 (2011); Teamsters Local 264 (Penna), 27 PERB ¶ 3081, 3187 (1994).   
13 See TWU (Waters), 49 PERB ¶ 3026, at 3083; CSEA (Bienko), 47 PERB ¶ 3027, at 
3082-3083; CSEA (Smulyan), 45 PERB ¶ 3008, 3017 (2012).  
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 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Robert W. Brewster (Brewster) to a 
decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
dismissing his improper practice charge.1   
 In his initial charge, Brewster alleged that Sullivan County and the Sullivan 
County Sheriff (Employer) violated §§ 209-a.1 (a), (b) and (d) of the Public Employees’ 
Fair Employment Act (Act) and that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 
1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) violated §§ 209-a.2 (a), (b) and (c) of the Act.  The 
charge alleged that, on or about September 7, 2016, Brewster read the Taylor Law and 
“discovered” that he “was never advised or instructed of his ‘Right of Organization’ 
pursuant to Taylor Law section 202,” and that CSEA “has breached its duty of [f]air 
[r]epresentation commencing 1991, by not…instructing [him] on his rights” pursuant to 
that section.  In the charge, Brewster also asserted that CSEA is the “union of choice of 
                                            
1 50 PERB ¶ 4527 (2017).  
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the [C]ounty and the Sheriff,” and asked that PERB remove CSEA “as the recognized 
union representative.” 
 Brewster was advised that his charge was deficient because, inter alia, only 
CSEA was identified as a respondent on the charge form and there are no facts alleged 
to arguably establish a violation of §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (b), or §§ 209-a.2 (a) and (c) of 
the Act. 
 In response, Brewster filed an amendment on January 20, 2017, alleging only a 
violation of § 209-a.2 (a) of the Act by CSEA, and adding in the “details of charge” that 
“by not providing ‘[f]air [r]epresentation’ in addressing, and instructing [him] of his right 
of choice, CSEA is ‘restraining’ [him] from pursuing such right of choice.” 
 The Director found that Brewster’s amended charge failed to correct the 
deficiencies of the earlier charge, and she dismissed his charge in full. 
EXCEPTIONS 
 Brewster filed exceptions to the Director’s decision.  Brewster again argues that 
CSEA violated its duty of fair representation by failing to inform him of his rights under 
the Act.  Brewster also appears to challenge the validity of the Employer’s recognition of 
CSEA as the exclusive bargaining representative of a unit of correction officers in 1990.  
 CSEA filed a response to Brewster’s exceptions, in which it supports the decision 
of the Director.   
 Based on our review of the record and our consideration of the parties’ 
arguments, we affirm the Director’s decision and dismiss the charge. 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm the Director’s decision.  As she found, there is no provision of the 
Taylor Law that imposes a legal duty upon the incumbent employee organization to 
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inform or instruct its members regarding their organizational rights.  Moreover, we agree 
that an improper practice proceeding is not the proper forum to challenge CSEA’s 
recognition.  Part 201 of the Board’s Rules of Procedure provides rules for filing a 
petition alleging that an employee organization which has been certified or is being 
currently recognized should be deprived of representation status as to all or part of a 
unit (“petition for decertification”).  
Finally, we note that Brewster’s exceptions contain asserted facts and 
documents that were not presented to the Director, primarily concerning a 
representation proceeding for a unit of deputy sheriffs employed by the Employer.  Our 
review of the Director's decision is limited to the record as it existed before her.2  Only  
in extraordinary circumstances such as the discovery of new evidence which could not 
reasonably have been discovered in proceedings before the Director would we consider 
such evidence or arguments.  No such extraordinary circumstances are present here.3  
Therefore, we do not consider the facts and documents presented by Brewster for the 
first time on exceptions. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the improper practice charge is dismissed. 
DATED:  August 31, 2017 
               Albany, New York     
 
                                            
2 Mt. Pleasant Cottage UFSD, 50 PERB ¶ 3002, 3009, n. 12 (2017); CSEA (Josey), 49 
PERB ¶ 3022, 3072 (2016); Smithtown Fire District, 28 PERB ¶ 3060, 3135 (1995).   
3 CSEA (Reese), 25 PERB ¶ 3012, 3032, n. 1 (1992); New York City Transit Auth, 23 
PERB ¶ 3016, 3034 (1990); Buffalo Professional Firefighters Assn, Inc (Summers), 22 
PERB ¶ 3040, 3094 (1989).  
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Syed W. Javed (Javed) to a 
decision and order of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing his improper 
practice charge, in which he alleged that District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 
2627 (DC 37) violated §§ 209-a.2 (a) and (c) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment 




Act (Act).1  The charge alleged that DC 37 breached its duty of fair representation when 
it refused to file a grievance on Javed’s behalf challenging the termination of his 
employment.  The ALJ granted DC 37 and the City University of New York (CUNY)’s 
motion to dismiss the charge for failure to present sufficient evidence to establish a 
prima facie case.   
EXCEPTIONS 
 Javed filed wide-ranging exceptions.  Javed essentially argues that DC 37 failed 
in its duty of fair representation by failing to be more aggressive in representing Javed in 
disciplinary proceedings after Javed was placed on administrative leave with pay in May 
2014, and by failing to file a grievance challenging Javed’s termination in February 
2015.  Javed excepts to the ALJ’s ruling on the timeliness of certain allegations and to 
the ALJ’s ruling that Javed would not be allowed to testify by telephone.   
DC 37 supports the decision of the ALJ and contends that no basis has been 
demonstrated for reversal.  DC 37 also argues that certain of Javed’s exceptions should 
not be considered because they make factual assertions that were not raised at the 
hearing before the ALJ.  
Based on our review of the record and our consideration of the parties’ 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ’s decision and dismiss the charge.   
FACTS 
 The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ’s decision, and are discussed here only as 
far as is necessary to address the exceptions.  DC 37 represents a unit of white collar 
                                            
1 49 PERB ¶ 4573 (2016).   




employees who work for CUNY, including, among other titles, that of Information 
Technology (IT) Assistant III.  
In April 2001, Javed was hired to work at Medgar Evers College (College), a 
constituent college of CUNY.  Javed was initially hired to work as an IT Assistant III in 
the office of information technology.  In April 2012, he was provisionally appointed to the 
position of IT Security Manager, also referred to as a Computer System Manager (CSM) 
Level III, a managerial position that is not represented by DC 37.   
On May 21, 2014, the College terminated Javed from his provisional CSM 
position, returned him to his permanent position of IT Assistant III.  On the same day, 
the College served him with disciplinary charges pertaining to both his CSM and IT 
Assistant III positions, and placed him on administrative leave with pay.   
On June 10, 2014, a step 1 hearing was held in the disciplinary charges that 
pertained to Javed’s CSM position.  Javed was represented during that hearing by DC 
37, even though the allegations pertained to his conduct as a CSM, a position not 
represented by DC 37.  To rebut the allegations made against him, Javed submitted a 
detailed statement with attached documents, which totaled more than 100 pages.   
A step 1 hearing was scheduled for June 11, 2014 to address the disciplinary 
charges that pertained to Javed’s IT Assistant III position, but the hearing was cancelled 
when DC 37 informed CUNY that it would rest based upon the evidence submitted the 
prior day.2  On June 11, 2014, Robert Ajaye, the local unit president, and Dana 
Tilghman, a DC 37 representative, met with Javed and advised him that DC 37 would 
                                            
2 Javed's Affidavit at ¶ 8, ALJ Ex 5.  




wait for CUNY to issue a determination regarding his disciplinary proceedings before 
taking any further action.3   
Javed’s affidavit shows that DC 37 made certain efforts on Javed’s behalf in or 
about August 2014.  Because Javed needed to renew his work permit by February 6, 
2015, to continue working within the United States, a DC 37 representative contacted 
Counsel for the College and asked the College to support Javed’s request to renew his 
work permit.4  
Javed alleges that he complained to Tilghman and Ajaye that he feared that the 
College was taking too long to determine his disciplinary cases and that his work permit 
was going to expire.  According to Javed, they told him that DC 37 would wait for the 
College to issue a step 1 decision.5  Nonetheless, in or about August 2014, DC 37 
contacted CUNY’s Director of Labor Relations and asked the College to either promptly 
proceed to arbitration or dismiss the disciplinary charges pending against Javed.   
On January 21, 2015, Javed asked DC 37 to file a grievance regarding CUNY’s 
failure to determine his disciplinary cases, but DC 37 told him that they could not file a 
grievance because he was on full pay status and, therefore, there was no violation of 
the collective bargaining agreement.6   
The College took no further action in the disciplinary charges it initiated against 
Javed and never issued a step I decision.  Javed remained on paid administrative leave 
                                            
3 Id.  
4 Javed's Affidavit at ¶ 10, ALJ Ex 5.   
5 Javed's Affidavit at ¶¶ 11-12, ALJ Ex 5.  
6 Javed's Affidavit at ¶ 15, ALJ Ex 5. 




until February 6, 2015.  The College terminated his employment on February 7, 2015, 
citing the expiration of his immigration status as the basis for the termination.7   
Javed called DC 37 numerous times after his February 7, 2015 termination and 
also sent emails to DC 37 representatives when his calls were not returned.  The record 
shows that Javed sent emails to Ajaye and other DC 37 representatives on February 
11, 13, and 18, 2015, advising them of the termination letter he received and asking for 
assistance.8  On February 18, 2015, Tilghman advised Javed that his case had been 
referred to DC 37’s Legal Department for review.9   
On February 23, 2015, an attorney from DC 37’s Legal Department sent 
Tilghman a memorandum stating that CUNY had refused to provide the federal 
government with information establishing that Javed’s position is difficult to recruit.  The 
memorandum further states that Javed’s work visa had expired on February 6, 2015; 
and that the work visa was a qualification for employment.  The memorandum also 
explains that, because Javed was terminated for failure to meet an employment 
qualification, his termination could not be challenged as a wrongful disciplinary action.  
The memorandum notes that DC 37 does not provide representation regarding 
immigration matters.10  
On March 10, 2015, Javed sent another email to Ajaye noting that thirty days had 
passed since his termination and requesting that DC 37 initiate a grievance to contest 
                                            
7 Exhibit C annexed to DC 37’s answer, ALJ Ex 3.  
8 Charging Party’s Exs 2 and 3.  
9 Charging Party’s Ex 3.  
10 Exhibit F annexed to ALJ Ex 3.    




his termination.  Ajaye responded by email dated March 11, 2015: 
Mr. Javed I discussed your issue with the attorneys at DC 37.  I was 
told the CUNY has no obligation to sponsor you.  Unfortunately 
CUNY has used this against you.  I have been advised that there is 
nothing we can do.11   
 
DC 37 never filed a grievance challenging Javed’s February 7, 2015 termination. 
At the start of the hearing on this matter before the ALJ, Javed’s counsel moved 
for permission to allow Javed to testify by telephone, stating that Javed could not be 
present and was out of the country due to his immigration status.12  The respondents 
opposed the motion.  The ALJ denied the motion on the grounds that PERB has not 
previously allowed telephone testimony, that granting the motion would deprive the ALJ 
of the ability to judge the credibility of the witness and would impair the respondents’ 
ability to cross-examine the witness, and because the request was belatedly made at 
the commencement of the hearing.  The ALJ did allow Javed’s wife, Anella Wasif, who 
was present at the hearing, to testify on Javed’s behalf.   
Wasif testified that, after Javed received the March 11, 2015 email from Ajaye, 
Javed spoke with Ajaye and Tilghman, but they failed to assist him.  Wasif further 
testified that, after March 11, 2015, Javed continued to ask Ajaye and Tilghman to file a 
grievance or proceed to arbitration on his behalf, but they repeatedly told him that there 
                                            
11 Charging Party’s Ex 5.  
12 At the time of the hearing, Javed was represented by counsel.  After the hearing, the 
Board received a letter from Javed’s counsel stating that he and Javed “have agreed 
that, going forward, I will no longer be representing him.”  The Board requested from 
counsel confirmation that his attorney-client relationship with Javed has been 
terminated, such as a termination agreement, a disengagement letter, or a letter from 
Javed.  Although no such confirmation has been received by PERB to date, we shall 
treat Javed as a pro se charging party for purposes of deciding his exceptions.  




was nothing DC 37 could do on his behalf.  
DISCUSSION 
Testimony by telephone 
 In his exceptions, Javed argues that he was out of the country in order to comply 
with United States’ immigration laws but that he was available to testify via telephone or 
Skype, and that the ALJ erred in refusing to allow such testimony.  Javed also argues 
that, in the alternative, “Javed should have been given time to be physically present if 
virtual presence wasn’t allowed.”  Under the circumstances here, we find that the ALJ’s 
granting of one of the two modes of compiling a complete record proposed by Javed’s 
counsel (i.e., allowing his wife to testify) renders Javed’s exception unpreserved as 
waived. 
As a threshold matter, we agree with the ALJ that it was not appropriate for 
Javed to make this request, for the first time, on the first day of the hearing.  Javed 
made no attempt to seek the consent of the other parties or to make a motion that could 
be reviewed by the ALJ prior to the start of the hearing.  Because alternative modes of 
testimony may require technology and/or arrangements and accommodations that are 
not present when witnesses are testifying in person, as at a standard hearing, such a 
motion should be made well in advance of the initial hearing date. 
The ALJ did not simply refuse Javed’s request, relayed by counsel, that Javed be 
permitted to testify via telephone.  Rather, the ALJ granted Javed’s alternative 




proposition that his wife be permitted to testify in his stead.13  The ALJ also admitted 
Javed’s affidavit, setting forth his version of the facts, into evidence.14  Having 
affirmatively proposed these two suggestions as acceptable alternatives, Javed cannot 
be heard to complain that the ALJ accepted one of them, here, the suggested mode that 
allowed for live, in person testimony.15     
In so deciding, the ALJ correctly pointed out the fundamental flaw of testimony 
via telephone: that the witnesses’ demeanor cannot be evaluated.  As the ALJ 
explained, granting the motion, over the opposition of the respondents, would impair the 
ability of the respondents to cross-examine Javed, and would deprive the ALJ of the 
ability to gauge the demeanor and credibility of Javed.16  While some courts do allow 
testimony by telephone, these courts do so under statutory schemes that, unlike the 
                                            
13 Tr, at 4-6, 12.  
14 Tr, at 13, 16.  
15 It is well established that the Board will not address arguments raised for the first time 
on exceptions.  See, eg, New York State Thruway Assn, 47 PERB ¶ 3032, 3100, at n. 
25 (2014); Rochester Teachers Assn (Hirsch), 46 PERB ¶ 3035, 3078 (2013); County of 
Sullivan and Sullivan County Sheriff, 41 PERB ¶ 3006, 3038 (2008); Town of Penfield, 
30 PERB ¶ 3060, 3154 n. 7 (1997).  
16 See Hughes v Elliot, 768 NYS2d 74 (Sup Ct, 9th and 10th Judicial Districts 2003) 
(“Testimony by telephone prevents effective evaluation of demeanor as well as effective 
cross-examination simply because the witness cannot be seen.”); Van Dyke v Jefferson 
Anesthesiology Svcs, P.C., Index No. 98-0070 (Sup Ct Jefferson Cty Sept 6, 2001) 
(denying untimely request to take trial testimony by telephone deposition because 
“Court cannot devise an Order which would allow telephone testimony to be used at trial 
in a manner which sufficiently protects the plaintiff's right to ascertain the witness's 
identity and to be present at the site of the witness's testimony if the Plaintiff chooses.”).  
Act, provide for such a procedure in particular circumstances.17      
Under these circumstances, the ALJ’s refusal to grant Javed’s request that he be 
allowed to testify via telephone did not constitute an abuse of discretion. We find that 
the ALJ did not err by refusing to grant Javed’s request that he be allowed to testify via 
phone.   
 Because our review is limited to the record before the ALJ, we do not address 
alternative methods of addressing Javed’s legal unavailability impermissibly raised for 
the first time in his exceptions,18 such as employing Skype or similar methods of remote 
testifying that allow for the evaluation of demeanor.  We do note that such 
methodologies have, on specific and compelling occasions, been approved by the 
courts, and we neither mandate nor foreclose the employment of such methods in 
cases of genuine unavailability and compelling need.19   
Timeliness of charge 
 Section 204.1 (a) of the Rules requires an improper practice charge to be filed 
                                            
17 For example, the Family Court Act provides that “the court may permit a party or a 
witness to be deposed or to testify by telephone, audio-visual means, or other electronic 
means at a designated family court or other location” in certain circumstances.  See §§ 
433, 531-a, and 580-316.  See also 22 CRR-NY 205.44 (2017).  Telephone testimony is 
also allowed in hearings before the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.  See 12 
NYCRR 461.7 [c] [2]; Matter of Rothstein [Commissioner of Labor], 306 AD2d 789, 790, 
(3d Dept 2003).  
18 New York State Thruway Assn, 47 PERB ¶ 3032, at 3100, n. 25. 
19 The Court of Appeals has found that it was within a trial court’s discretion to permit 
live, two-way televised testimony following a finding of necessity in a criminal trial.  
People of the State of New York v Wrotten, 14 NY3d 33 (2009) (finding), cert denied 
560 U.S. 959 (2010).  The Court has also held that courts have discretion to utilize live, 
two-way video testimony in civil proceedings, but only where exceptional circumstances 
require or when all parties consent.  State of New York v Robert F., 25 NY3d 448 
(2015).  Because Javed failed to preserve this argument for review, we make no finding 
on whether his circumstances would qualify as exceptional circumstances justifying the 
use of live, two-way video testimony.     




within four months of when the charging party had actual or constructive knowledge of 
the conduct that forms the basis for the alleged improper practice.20  We agree with the 
ALJ that the charge’s allegation that DC 37 failed in its duty of fair representation by 
failing to take action from May 22, 2014 until February 6, 2015 is untimely.  Like the 
ALJ, we presume the truth of the facts pled in the charge and in Javed’s supporting 
affidavit dated August 21, 2015.  These facts demonstrate that Javed knew, as early as 
June 11, 2014, that DC 37 had decided not to take further action regarding the 
disciplinary charges filed against Javed until CUNY issued step 1 decisions in those 
matters.     
 Although Javed knew by June 11, 2014 that DC 37 was not going to take further 
action until CUNY issued step 1 decisions, he did not file his charge until June 1, 2015, 
beyond the four months set forth in the Rules.21  While Javed asserts that DC 37 
“misled” him “about the procedure,” all of DC 37’s actions and statements to Javed were 
consistent with their position that no action would be taken until step 1 decisions issued.  
It is clear that Javed disagreed with DC 37’s position, but if he wished to challenge DC 
37’s position as a violation of its duty of fair representation under the Act, he had a four-
month time period in which to do so.  
                                            
20 See, eg, District Council 37 and Bd of Ed of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York 
(Bacchus), 50 PERB ¶ 3013, 3057-3058 (2017); UFT and Bd of Ed of the City Sch Dist 
of the City of New York (Davis), 50 PERB ¶ 3014, 3059 (2017); New York State 
Thruway Auth, 40 PERB ¶ 4533, 4595 (2007); Civil Service Employees Assn, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 28 PERB ¶ 3072, 3168, n. 4 (1995).   
21 As the ALJ found, even if the time period for filing was considered from January 21, 
2015, when DC 37 told Javed that it would not file a grievance on his behalf, the charge 
was still filed more than four months later and was therefore untimely.  




Merits of the pre-termination aspects of the charge 
Although the ALJ found the allegations with respect to DC 37’s conduct from May 
22, 2014 until February 6, 2015 to be untimely, she nevertheless assessed Javed’s 
allegations on the merits and found that Javed failed to establish a prima facie case.  
We agree.   
The Board has often reaffirmed that “to establish a breach of the duty of fair 
representation under the Act, a charging party has the burden of proof to demonstrate 
that an employee organization's conduct or actions are arbitrary, discriminatory or 
founded in bad faith.”22 
As we have previously explained, the courts have: 
reject[ed] the standard . . . that “irresponsible or grossly 
negligent” conduct may form the basis for a union' s breach 
of the duty of fair representation as not within the meaning of 
improper employee organization practices set forth in Civil 
Service Law § 209-a. An honest mistake resulting from 
misunderstanding or lack of familiarity with matters of 
procedure does not rise to the level of the requisite arbitrary, 
discriminatory or bad-faith conduct required to establish an 
improper practice by the union.23 
 
Thus, “an employee's mere disagreement with the tactics utilized or 
                                            
22 TWU Local 100 and NYCTA (Waters), 49 PERB ¶ 3026, 3083 (2016); District Council 
37 (Calendario), 49 PERB ¶ 3015, 3060 (2016), quoting UFT (Cruz), 48 PERB ¶ 3004, 
3010, petition denied, Cruz v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 48 PERB ¶ 7003 (Sup Ct NY 
Co 2015) (internal quotation and editing marks omitted), quoting UFT (Munroe), 47 
PERB ¶ 3031, 3095 (2014), petition denied, 48 PERB ¶ 7002 (Sup Ct NY Co 2015) 
(quoting CSEA (Bienko), 47 PERB ¶ 3027, 3082-3083 (2014)); see District Council 37, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Farrey), 41 PERB ¶ 3027, 3119 (2008). 
23 Id.; see also Cairo-Durham Teachers Assn, 47 PERB ¶ 3008, 3026 (2014) 
(quoting CSEA, L 1000 v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd (Diaz), 132 AD 2d 430, 432, 20 
PERB ¶ 7024, 7039 (3d Dept 1987), affirmed on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB 
¶ 7017 (1988)). 




dissatisfaction with the quality or extent of representation does not constitute a breach 
of the duty of fair representation.”24  
The Board has also long held that employee organizations are entitled to a wide 
range of reasonable discretion in the processing of grievances under the Act and that it 
will not substitute its judgment for that of an employee organization.25  Thus, an 
employee organization “does not have the duty to take every grievance presented to it 
or to process every grievance through the grievance procedure as long as its decision is 
promptly communicated to the employee and is not arbitrary, discriminatory or made in 
bad faith.”26  Therefore, an employee organization’s mere refusal to file a grievance, 
without more, is insufficient to support a violation of the Act.27      
Like the ALJ, we assume the truth of Javed’s factual contentions and give Javed 
the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts, as is 
appropriate when deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to establish a prima facie 
case.28  Nevertheless, we agree with the ALJ that Javed failed to present sufficient facts 
which, if true, would establish that DC 37 acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith 
during the time period from May 22, 2014 until February 6, 2015.   
                                            
24 Id. 
25 UPSEU (Brewster Phillips), 32 PERB ¶ 3027, 3058 (1999).  See also District Council 
37 (Calendario), 49 PERB ¶ 3015, at 3060; UFT (Gibson), 48 PERB ¶ 3015, 3054 
(2015) United Steelworkers, Local 9434-00 (Buchalski), 43 PERB ¶ 3002, 3008 (2010); 
Public Employees Fedn, AFL-CIO (Reese), 29 PERB ¶ 3027, 3062 (1996); Faculty 
Assn of Hudson Valley Comm Coll (Dansereau), 15 PERB ¶ 3080, 3124 (1982).   
26 American Fedn of State, County and Municipal Employees, Local 650, 43 PERB         
¶ 3019, 3078 (2010); United Public Service Employees Union (Phillips), 32 PERB          
¶ 3027, 3058 (1999).   
27 UPSEU (Phillips), 32 PERB ¶ 3027, at 3058.  
28 Town of Tuscarora, 45 PERB ¶ 3044, 3112 (2012).    




As the ALJ found, the facts as asserted by Javed in the charge and in his 
affidavit do not support Javed’s allegation that DC 37 failed to take action on Javed’s 
behalf during this time frame.  DC 37 represented Javed at the step 1 hearing to 
address the disciplinary charges on June 11, 2014, contacted the College’s counsel to 
advocate that the College support Javed’s application to renew his work permit, and 
contacted CUNY’s Director of Labor Relations and argued that the College should either 
promptly proceed to arbitration or dismiss the disciplinary charges pending against 
Javed.  Although DC 37 refused Javed’s request that it file a grievance challenging the 
College’s inaction in January 2015, DC 37 advised Javed that it could not do so 
because Javed was on full pay status and there was, therefore, no violation of the 
collective-bargaining agreement.  As the ALJ explained, that Javed disagreed with DC 
37’s interpretation of the contract is not a basis to find a violation of the Act.29  As 
explained above, an employee organization’s decision not to file a grievance is 
insufficient to support a violation of the Act, without evidence that the decision is 
arbitrary, discriminatory, or made in bad faith.  We find no such evidence on the record 
before us.   
We note that portions of Javed’s exceptions suggest an argument that the CUNY 
and DC 37 colluded together to terminate Javed’s employment because of Javed’s 
ethnicity, race, and/or national origin.  We note that the Employer’s actions are not 
under review in the case here.  In any event, Javed’s assertions of collusion and 
                                            
29 See CSEA (Trowbridge), 48 PERB ¶ 3024, 3093 (2015); UFT (Hunt), 45 PERB          
¶ 3038, 3094 (2012); Nassau Community College Federation of Teachers, 42 PERB      
¶ 3007, 3021-3022 (2009).  




discrimination are entirely conclusory and are insufficient to prove a violation of the duty 
of fair representation.30  Javed also makes a number of factual assertions in his 
exceptions brief that were not presented at the hearing, in the charge, or in Javed’s 
supporting affidavit.  We disregard these assertions.  The Board has long held that “we 
will not consider allegations of fact made for the first time in exceptions when reviewing 
an ALJ's decision because our review is limited to the record as it was developed before 
the ALJ.”31   
Javed clearly disagreed with DC 37’s decision to await the College’s decision 
after the step 1 hearing before taking further action.  However, DC 37’s decision is the 
type of tactical decision that employee organizations are entitled to make under the Act, 
and it cannot support a violation of DC 37’s duty of fair representation in the absence of 
evidence that the decision was arbitrary, discriminatory, or made in bad faith.32  Again, 
we find no such evidence on the record before us.    
Merits of the charge with respect to Javed’s termination on February 7, 2015 
We agree with the ALJ, for the reasons she stated, that Javed has not 
established that DC 37 violated its duty of fair representation by failing to file a 
                                            
30 See District Council 37 and Bd of Ed of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York 
(Candelario), 49 PERB ¶ 3015, 3062 (2016); UFT (Leon), 48 PERB ¶ 3016, 3056 
(2015); UFT (Cruz), 48 PERB ¶ 3004, at 3011, n. 18 (2015); UFT (Arredondo), 48 
PERB ¶ 3010, at 3034 (quoting Transport Workers Union, Local 100 (Brockington), 37 
PERB ¶ 3002, 3006 (2004); UFT (Munroe), 47 PERB ¶ 3031, at 3095, citing PEF 
(Goonewardena), 27 PERB ¶ 3006 (1994).   
31 CSEA (Josey), 49 PERB ¶ 3022, 3072 (2016) (quoting Smithtown Fire District, 28 
PERB ¶ 3060, 3135 (1995). 
32 See CSEA (Smulyan), 45 PERB ¶ 3008, 3017 (2012); ATU (Lefevre), 43 PERB         
¶ 3027, 3104 (2010).  




grievance challenging Javed’s termination.   
As explained above, an employee organization does not have the duty to take 
every grievance presented to it or to process every grievance through the grievance 
procedure as long as its decision is promptly communicated to the employee and is not 
arbitrary, discriminatory or made in bad faith.  DC 37 made a decision that Javed’s 
termination could not be grieved as a wrongful disciplinary action because Javed was 
terminated for failure to meet an employment qualification (possession of a valid work 
visa), and DC 37 communicated this decision to Javed.  DC 37 conducted an 
individualized assessment of the merits of a possible grievance, and there is no 
evidence that DC 37’s decision was arbitrary, discriminatory or made in bad faith.  
Rather, DC 37 had a good-faith belief that a grievance challenging Javed’s termination 
was without merit.  Again, Javed disagreed with DC 37’s decision.  Even if Javed were 
correct, however, he would have, at most, asserted “an honest mistake resulting from 
misunderstanding,” insufficient to constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation.33   
Based upon the foregoing, we deny Javed’s exceptions and affirm the decision of 
the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
                                            
33 See District Council 37 (Candelario), 49 PERB ¶ 3015, at 3062, quoting CSEA 
(Munroe), 47 PERB ¶ 3031 (2014); Intl Union of Operating Engineers, 48 PERB ¶ 3019, 
3063 (2015).  
 
dismissed in its entirety.   
DATED: August 31, 2017 
     Albany, New York 
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 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) finding that the Montgomery County Deputy Sheriff’s Police Benevolent 
Association (Association) violated § 209-a.2 (b) of the Public Employees’ Fair 
Employment Act (Act).1  The ALJ found that the Association violated the Act by 
submitting to compulsory interest arbitration certain proposals that are not arbitrable 
under § 209.4 (g) of the Act.  
EXCEPTIONS 
The Association excepts to the ALJ’s findings that four of its proposals were not 
arbitrable.  The Association argues that Proposal No. 10, Section 1 (Intent) was not in 
issue for decision.  With respect to the remaining three proposals, the Association 
                                            
1 49 PERB ¶ 4568 (2016).  
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argues that the proposals are directly related to compensation and are therefore 
arbitrable.  For the following reasons, we affirm the ALJ’s decision, in part, and remand, 
in part.  
DISCUSSION 
 Section 209.4 (g) of the Act limits the availability of interest arbitration to 
“members of any organized unit of deputy sheriffs who: (1) are engaged directly in 
criminal law enforcement activities that aggregate more than” 50% of their service, and 
(2) are encompassed within the definition of “police officers” pursuant to § 1.20 (34) of 
the Criminal Procedure Law, with certification requirements for both qualifications.  For 
such employees, inclusive of the unit members at issue here, interest arbitration: 
shall only apply to the terms of collective bargaining 
agreements directly relating to compensation, including, but 
not limited to, salary, stipends, location pay, insurance, 
medical and hospitalization benefits; and shall not apply to 
non-compensatory issues including, but not limited to, job 
security, disciplinary procedures and actions, deployment or 
scheduling, or issues relating to eligibility for overtime 
compensation which shall be governed by other provisions 
[prescribed] by law.  
 
 In construing this language, the Board has repeatedly reaffirmed the test for 
determining whether a particular demand is directly related to compensation, and 
therefore arbitrable under § 209.4 (g) of the Act, first articulated in New York State 
Police (State Police): 
The degree of a demand's relationship to compensation is 
measured by the characteristic of the demand. If the sole, 
predominant or primary characteristic of the demand is 
compensation, then it is arbitrable because the demand to 
that extent directly relates to compensation. A demand has 
compensation as its sole, predominant or primary 
characteristic only when it seeks to effect some change in 
amount or level of compensation by either payment from the 
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State to or on behalf of an employee or the modification of 
an employee's financial obligation arising from the 
employment relationship (e.g., a change in an insurance 
copayment).  If the effect is otherwise, then the relationship 
of the demand becomes secondary and indirect and the 
subject is, therefore, excluded from the scope of compulsory 
arbitration under the language of § 209.4 [g].2 
 
 As the Board further explained in County of Orange: 
Under that test, each proposal must be examined separately 
to discern whether its sole, predominant or primary 
characteristic is a modification in the amount or level of 
compensation. Consistent with State Police, in applying that 
test, we will compare a proposal with the subjects 
specifically identified by the Legislature as being arbitrable: 
“salary, stipends, location pay, insurance, medical and 
hospitalization benefits.” In addition, we will compare the 
proposal with those subjects declared by the Legislature to 
be nonarbitrable: “job security, disciplinary procedures and 
actions, deployment or scheduling, or issues relating to 
eligibility for overtime compensation.”3  
 
 Where a bargaining proposal contains two or more inseparable elements, i.e., 
a unitary demand, at least one of which is nonmandatory, the entire proposal is deemed 
nonmandatory.4  
In the instant case, the Association challenges the ALJ’s ruling that four of its 
proposals were not “directly related to compensation” and thus not arbitrable under § 
                                            
2 30 PERB ¶ 3013, 3028 (1997), confirmed sub nom. New York State Police 
Investigators Assn v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 30 PERB ¶ 7011 (Sup Ct Albany 
County 1997) (emphasis in original); see also Chenango County Law Enforcement 
Assn, Inc., 50 PERB ¶ 3005, 3024 (2017); Madison County Deputy Sheriff’s PBA, 49 
PERB ¶ 3029, 3090-3091 (2016); County of Broome, 44 PERB ¶ 3046, 3137 (2011). 
3 44 PERB ¶ 3023, 3080 (2011). 
4 Id, at 3081.  See also Chenango County Law Enforcement Assn, Inc., 50 PERB          
¶ 3005, at 3027, n. 6; Madison County Deputy Sheriff’s PBA, 49 PERB ¶ 3029, at 3091; 
County of Broome, 44 PERB ¶ 3046, at 3137; City of White Plains, 33 PERB ¶ 3051, 
3138 (2000).  
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209.4 (g) of the Act.5  We address each proposal in turn.   
Proposal No. 4, Section 2 (work day and work week) 
 The Association’s Proposal No. 4, Section 2 seeks to add the following 
provisions to the CBA: 
Effective July 1, 2015, overtime for patrol coverage shall be offered, 
by seniority, to all full time employees, as follows: 
 
• By volunteers from those employees assigned to and 
scheduled to patrol coverage (Criminal Division), including 
building security employees; and 
 
• In the event there are insufficient volunteers, then 
Investigators shall be entitled to volunteer for patrol coverage 
(Criminal Division), as long as it does not overlap their 
working hours; and 
 
• In the event there are still insufficient volunteers, then other 
employees shall be entitled to volunteer for patrol coverage 
(Criminal Division), as long as it does not overlap their 
working hours (example: Lieutenant, etc.).  
 
The overtime list for emergencies, specialized units or specialized 
training shall not be applicable (Example: K-9, breathalyzer, etc.). 
The overtime list for Investigators shall be a separate rotating 
overtime list.6  
 
  The ALJ found that all aspects of Proposal No. 4, Section 2 regulate “who 
among” the unit employees will be given an overtime opportunity and that the proposal 
was therefore nonarbitrable pursuant to the Board’s decision in State Police.7  We 
agree.   
                                            
5 The County also challenged the arbitrability of the Association’s Proposal No. 10, 
Section 5.  The ALJ found that this proposal was arbitrable, and the County has not filed 
any exceptions to this finding.  As a result, any exceptions to the ALJ’s finding have 
been waived.  Rules of Procedure § 213.2 (b) (4); see, eg, Village of Endicott, 47 PERB 
¶3017, 3052, n. 5 (2014); NYCTA (Burke), 49 PERB ¶ 3021, 3072, n. 4 (2016) (citing 
cases). 
6 Improper Practice Charge U-34642, Ex. A, p. 2.  
7 30 PERB ¶ 3013, at 3030.   
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 In State Police, the Board found that the words “eligibility for,” as set forth in the 
Act, plainly refer to “who among” the unit employees would be eligible for or entitled to 
overtime pay, issues which are noncompensatory and therefore nonarbitrable.  The 
Association’s proposal here exclusively relates to overtime procedures which determine 
“who among” the unit employees would be eligible for overtime.  While the proposal 
would have an effect on the overtime compensation certain employees earned, that 
effect is nevertheless indirect.  The proposal itself effects no change in the amount or 
level of compensation and, unlike in State Police, the proposal does not deal “with how 
much those unit employees who are determined to be eligible for overtime 
compensation under applicable law will be paid” or “the point at which their entitlement 
to overtime will attach.”8   
Proposal No. 10, Section 1 (intent) 
 The Association’s Proposal No. 10 seeks to amend the contractual procedures 
for the administration of Section 207-c of the General Municipal Law for the County of 
Montgomery.  Section 1 of the proposal seeks to insert “Deputy Sheriff” where 
“Correction Officers” appears; insert definition of a working day, and insert title of who 
the application for 207-c benefits submitted to.9  
 The ALJ found that Section 1 of the Association’s Proposal 10 was not arbitrable.  
The Association argues that this proposal was not in issue for decision, pointing to a 
letter from conferencing ALJ Alicia McNally to the parties.10  ALJ McNally’s letter, dated 
March 1, 2016, was sent to all of the parties and listed the Association’s proposals that 
                                            
8 Id. 
9 Improper Practice Charge U-34642, Ex. A, p. 5.  
10 The case was subsequently reassigned to a different ALJ to issue the decision.  
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remained at issue.  The letter listed the Association’s Proposal No. 4, Section 2 and 
Proposal No. 10, Sections 2, 5, and 9, but there was no mention of Proposal No. 10, 
Section 1.  The letter then stated, “If I do not receive notice from the parties by March 7, 
2016 that any of the above is inaccurate, I will assume that this letter accurately 
reiterates the only at-issue proposals.”  The letter then concluded by giving the parties 
the opportunity to file briefs.   
 The Association sent a letter to ALJ McNally, dated March 2, 2016, pointing out 
that one sentence in Proposal No. 4 was missing.  Neither the County of Montgomery 
nor the Montgomery County Sheriff responded to the ALJ’s letter.  In its response to the 
Association’s exceptions, the County argues that Proposal No. 10, Section 1 was still at 
issue in these proceedings and that it was improperly excluded from ALJ McNally’s 
March 1, 2016 statement of the open issues.   
 From our review of the record,11 we find that the record is insufficiently clear for 
us to determine whether the allegation that the Association violated § 209.4 (g) of the 
Act by submitting Proposal No. 10, Section 1 to compulsory interest arbitration 
remained active before the ALJ.  Because of the ambiguity of the record, we cannot 
determine whether the ALJ properly made a finding on the arbitrability of this proposal.  
                                            
11 In addition to ALJ McNally’s March 1, 2016 letter, the record also includes the improper 
practice charge in Case No. U-34642 with Exhibit A attached thereto (the Association’s 
Petition for Compulsory Interest Arbitration, dated October 26, 2015, with Attachment 1 
containing the Association’s proposals); the Association’s answer in case No. U-34642; the 
improper practice charge in Case No. U-34670 with Exhibit A attached thereto (the parties’ 
2009-2012 CBA), and Exhibit B attached thereto (the Joint Employer’s response to the 
Association’s Petition for Compulsory Interest Arbitration, dated November 4, 2015, with 
Exhibit A containing the Joint Employer’s proposals); a December 30, 2015 letter from the 
Joint Employer’s attorney to ALJ McNally; a January 27, 2016 letter from ALJ McNally to the 
parties; a February 19, 2016 letter from the Joint Employer’s attorney to ALJ McNally; and 
the March 2, 2016 letter from the Association’s attorney to the conferencing ALJ mentioned 
above. 
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Accordingly, we remand this portion of the charge to the ALJ for further processing, 
including the filing of supplemental briefs, aimed at clarifying the record with regard to 
whether the County’s allegation regarding Proposal No. 10, Section 1 remained in issue 
before the ALJ and, if so, what the parties’ respective positions are in regard to that 
issue.  Nothing in our decision precludes the ALJ, at his discretion, 
from reopening the record for purposes of receiving offers of proof and/or additional 
evidence from the parties with respect to the remanded issue.    
Proposal No. 10, Section 2 (notice of disability or need for medical  
or hospital treatment) 
 
 Section 2 of the Association’s Proposal No. 10 provides that “[medical] release is 
limited to the injury and/or illness claim pursuant to 207-c.”12 
 We find that this proposal is nonarbitrable.  The proposal seeks to narrow the 
scope of information subject to medical release under the GML § 207-c procedures and 
is not directly related to compensation.13    
Proposal No. 10, Section 9 (continuation of contractual benefits) 
Section 9 of the Association’s Proposal No. 10 relates to the continuation of 
contractual benefits to employees while on leave pursuant to GML § 207-c.  The 
proposal states:  
all contractual benefits to be continued for up to one (1) year.  
Thereafter, provided with Base Wage (salary), longevity, 
shift differential, holidays, one-half (½) accumulation of sick 
leave, health insurance, dental insurance and vision 
                                            
12 Improper Practice Charge U-34642, Ex. A, p. 5. 
13 See Chenango County Law Enforcement Assn, Inc, 50 PERB ¶ 3005, 3025 (2017) 
(“Because the proposal addresses subjects that are not directly related to compensation 
(such as the content of the medical information release form), it is nonarbitrable.”); 
County of Tompkins and Tompkins County Sheriff, 44 PERB ¶ 3024, 3088 (2011) 
(same).    
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insurance.  
 
 We find that this proposal is not arbitrable.  The proposal contains components 
that are directly related to compensation as well as components that do not directly 
relate to compensation.  The first sentence of the proposal states that “all” contractual 
benefits are to be continued for up to one year.  This proposal, on its face, includes 
benefits beyond those directly related to compensation such as, for example, the 
accumulation of sick leave.  It is well-established that proposals for time off without a 
reduction in pay, such as the accumulation of sick leave, are not arbitrable.14  The 
second portion of the Association’s proposal also contains a demand for accumulation 
of sick leave.  Thus, even if we treat the two sentences of Proposal No. 10, Section 9 as 
separate demands, both contain elements that are not directly related to compensation 
and are thus not arbitrable.15  Because the proposal contains inseparable nonarbitrable 
components, Proposal No. 10, Section 9 does not satisfy the arbitrability test under § 
209.4 (g) of the Act.16 
The Association argues that “all contractual benefits” should be read to mean “all 
                                            
14 State Police, 30 PERB ¶ 3013, at 3029.  Although the Association urges us to revisit 
this portion of State Police, the Board has reaffirmed the principle that leave 
accumulation does not satisfy the arbitrability test under State Police on a number of 
occasions, and we see no reason to deviate from these prior holdings.  See, eg, County 
of Orange, 44 PERB ¶ 3023, at 3081; County of Tompkins, 44 PERB ¶ 3024, at 3088; 
Madison County Deputy Sheriff’s PBA, 49 PERB ¶ 3029, at 3092.  
15 The Association makes a cursory argument that, to whatever extent we find any of 
the Association’s demands to be unitary in nature, we should reexamine and reverse 
our “unitary demand” doctrine.  We decline the Association’s invitation to revisit and/or 
reverse the “unitary demand” doctrine.  As explained in County of Tompkins, 44 PERB  
¶ 3024, at 3088, such an approach is necessitated by the Legislature’s public policy 
choice of dividing the subject matter of proposals for deputy sheriffs into two classes 
with distinct impasse procedures.  See also County of Chenango, 50 PERB ¶ 3005, at 
3027 n. 10; County of Tompkins, 44 PERB ¶ 3024, at 3088.   
16 County of Orange, 44 PERB ¶ 3023, at 3088; County of Madison and Madison 
County Sheriff, 44 PERB ¶ 3035, 3117 (2011).  
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economic contractual benefits.”  We see no basis for the Association’s reading.  The 
language of the proposal is clear, unambiguous, and subject to only one reasonable 
reading.  The Association also argues that the Board should read the second sentence 
of Proposal No. 10, Section 9 as a separate demand and should strike any portions of 
the sentence that relate to items that are not directly related to compensation.  We 
reject the Association’s argument.  The arbitrable subjects within this proposal are 
inextricably intertwined with nonarbitrable subjects (at a minimum, the accumulation of 
sick leave).  It is, therefore, a nonarbitrable demand under § 209.4 (g) of the Act.   
 In sum, we affirm the ALJ’s finding that the Association violated § 209-a.2 (b) of 
the Act by submitting Proposal No. 4, Section 2 and Proposal No. 10, Sections 2 and 9 
to compulsory interest arbitration.  We remand the allegation concerning Proposal No. 
10, Section 1 for further processing consistent with this decision.  
DATED:  August 31, 2017 
     Albany, New York 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER  
 This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the United Federation of Teachers, 
Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (UFT) to a decision and order of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) dismissing an improper practice charge under the Public Employees’ Fair 
Employment Act (Act).1   
In 2012, after a hearing, the ALJ initially dismissed the charge in full.2  Upon 
review, the Board remanded for clarification of the factual record to determine whether 
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York (District) failed 
                                            
1 48 PERB ¶ 4607 (2015).  
2 45 PERB ¶ 4574 (2012). 
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to bargain over the impact of its decision to impose new standards of practice, known as 
the Speech and Language Standards of Practice, on speech and language teachers 
employed by the District and represented by the UFT.3  The Board also remanded for a 
determination of whether the District’s unilateral action significantly increased the 
workload of unit employers or, alternatively, extended their workday in violation of the § 
209-a.1 (d) of Act.  
After the remand, the ALJ reopened the record and gave the parties the 
opportunity to file supplemental briefs on all issues raised by the Board’s decision.  The 
ALJ then issued the decision under review, finding that the UFT failed to establish that 
the imposition of the standards of practice increased the length of speech teachers’ 
work day or significantly increased speech teachers’ workload.4   
The ALJ found that the District violated § 209-a.1 (d) of Act when it refused to 
negotiate the impact of the new standards of practice with the UFT.5  Neither party 
excepted to the ALJ’s finding concerning impact bargaining.  As a result, any exceptions 
to that determination have been waived.6 
EXCEPTIONS 
 In its exceptions, the UFT argues that the ALJ erred by not finding that the new 
standards of practice significantly increased the work hours and workload of speech and 
language teachers.  The UFT also argues that, if necessary to sustain the charge, the 
                                            
3 46 PERB ¶ 3031 (2013).  
4 48 PERB ¶ 4607, at 4894-4897.  
5 Id, at 4894.   
6 Rules of Procedure § 213.2 (b) (4); see, eg, Village of Endicott, 47 PERB ¶3017, 3052, 
n. 5 (2014); NYCTA (Burke), 49 PERB ¶ 3021, 3072, n. 4 (2016) (citing cases). 
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Board should adopt a new standard to analyze alleged workload improper practice 
charges and should find that an overall increase in work is a mandatory subject of 
bargaining.   
 Based on our review of the record and our consideration of the parties’ 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ’s decision and dismiss the charge.   
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ’s decisions, and are discussed here only 
as far as is necessary to address the exceptions.  The District employs approximately 
2,100 speech teachers who provide speech and language instruction to students who 
have communication disorders or delays.  These services are provided by the District 
pursuant to an individualized education plan (“IEP”) that is created for each student.   
Speech teachers generally provide instruction in groups of three to eight 
students.  Speech teachers teach five to eight classes daily, and are contractually 
entitled to one daily duty-free lunch period.  The number of hours that speech teachers 
are required to work each week is contractually defined.  Speech teachers’ workday 
includes 6 hours and 20 minutes of regular time and an additional 150 minutes per 
week, referred to as extended time.  
Speech teachers’ work includes preparing annual IEP reviews for each student 
on their caseload.  Generally, several IEPs may be due each month.  Annual reviews 
identify the progress a student has made towards reaching his or her annual IEP goals, 
determine whether the student continues to require speech services, and identify the 
services the student will require and the student’s annual goal for the following year.  
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Students who have received services for three years receive a triennial review, which is 
similar to an annual review but requires an assessment of the student’s performance 
over three years.  Requested reviews are in-depth reviews that are performed if a 
speech teacher deems it necessary or at the request of a parent, teacher, or other IEP 
team member.   
The only time available to speech teachers to perform the tasks required to 
prepare an IEP review is their unassigned time, when they are not teaching.  Speech 
teachers are contractually entitled to six unassigned periods each week.  Five of those 
weekly unassigned periods are daily preparation periods and the sixth is a weekly 
professional period.7  Although speech teachers primarily perform class preparation 
during their daily preparation periods and primarily write reports during their professional 
period, those tasks may be performed during any of the six weekly periods, as time 
permits.   
Sometime prior to the spring of 2009, the District created the standards of 
practice.  They are set forth in two manuals issued by the District, the “Middle School 
and High School Speech Standards of Practice Manual” (hereafter, “MHS manual”)8 
and the “Elementary School Manual” (hereafter, the “ES manual”).9  The ES and MHS 
manuals both require speech teachers to follow “RIOT” procedures, an acronym for 
“Review, Interview, Observe and Test,” in connection with annual, triennial and 
requested reviews.  The District created the standards of practice to deemphasize the 
                                            
7 Joint Ex 1, p. 24.  
8 Joint Ex 2.   
9 Joint Ex 3.   
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use of a medical model when evaluating students’ needs in favor of an educational 
model and to impose uniformity and consistency throughout the District in speech 
teachers’ practices.  It is the performance of the RIOT procedures to evaluate students 
and produce IEP reviews that is alleged to have increased speech teachers’ workload 
and workday.   
Mindy Karten Bornemann, a speech teacher who also serves as the UFT Speech 
Teachers Chapter Leader, testified that, before the standards of practice were 
implemented, speech teachers’ unassigned time was fully occupied and none of the 
tasks they performed were flexible or optional.  She further testified that, since the 
imposition of RIOT, the time during speech teachers’ scheduled workday has been 
insufficient to accomplish all the tasks added by RIOT, and speech teachers must work 
during their duty free lunch and past their scheduled workday to accomplish those 
tasks.  In contrast, Judith Manning, Central Office Speech Supervisor and the Director 
of the Center for Assistive Technology, testified that speech teachers performed most of 
the tasks required by RIOT before the standards of practice made those practices 
required and that the standards of practice do not significantly increase speech 
teachers’ workload or extend their workday.   
DISCUSSION 
The Board has held that an increase in workload may, in certain circumstances, 
be a mandatory subject of bargaining.  In New Rochelle Housing Authority, the Board 
held that: 
if increase in workload means that bargaining unit members 
are required to accomplish significantly more work in the 
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course of a workday, a change in terms and conditions of 
employment may have taken place, and the balancing test 
between employer mission and employer interest in terms 
and conditions of employment enunciated by this Board in a 
number of cases might apply.10 
 
The Board has also held that an employer is obligated to negotiate a decision to 
assign new duties to unit employees that results in the lengthening of the employees’ 
workday or scheduled hours of work, even though those duties are inherently a part of 
the employees’ occupation.11 
The ALJ found that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding either that 
speech teachers were required to accomplish significantly more work in the course of a 
workday or that employees’ workdays (i.e. their scheduled hours of work) had been 
lengthened.   
In her initial decision, the ALJ reviewed each aspect of the RIOT procedures to 
determine the extent to which the new standards of practice added to speech teachers’ 
workload and workday.  While the ALJ found that each of the RIOT elements may have 
added new tasks to speech teachers’ workday, and thus increased speech teachers’ 
workload to some extent, she found that the record was insufficient to quantify how 
much additional time is required to complete the additional tasks.12   
In the decision under review, the ALJ found that some of the tasks that speech 
teachers previously performed during unassigned time, such as administering 
                                            
10 21 PERB ¶ 3054, 3116 (1988).  See also Edgemont Union Free Sch Dist at 
Greenburgh, 21 PERB ¶ 3067 (1988); Capital Region BOCES, 36 PERB ¶ 3004 (2003).  
11 South Jefferson Cent Sch Dist, 13 PERB ¶ 3066 (1980); Sackets Harbor Cent Sch 
Dist, 13 PERB ¶ 3058 (1980).  
12 45 PERB ¶ 4574, at 4698.  
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standardized tests, were reduced, that Bornemann’s testimony regarding the practices 
of speech teachers before and after the new standards of practice were implemented is 
insufficient to demonstrate that those practices existed throughout the District, and that 
the record is insufficient to demonstrate that the tasks required by RIOT were all new 
tasks.13  The ALJ also found that the UFT’s time estimates for each of the tasks 
required by RIOT unreliable, as based on inaccurate information and thus insufficient as 
the basis for a finding.14    
 The UFT’s main argument on exceptions is that the ALJ erred in finding that the 
record before her was not sufficient to show that speech teachers were required to 
accomplish significantly more work in the course of a workday or that employees’ 
workdays (i.e. their scheduled hours of work) had been lengthened in order to perform 
the new expected tasks.   
 Having carefully reviewed the record, we find that the ALJ has provided a 
thorough and accurate recitation and analysis of all relevant facts in her decisions, and 
we conclude that there is no basis on which to reverse the ALJ’s finding that the District 
did not violate the Act when it unilaterally implemented the new standards of practice.  
The District did not mandate that speech teachers work additional hours and did not 
change speech teachers’ scheduled hours of work.15   
To the extent that the UFT argues that the ALJ erred by failing to credit 
Bornemann’s testimony over Manning’s testimony in all respects, we see no reason to 
                                            
13 48 PERB ¶ 4607, at 4895-4896.  
14 Id, at 4896-4897.  
15 Cf. South Jefferson Cent Sch Dist, 13 PERB ¶ 3066 (1980); Sackets Harbor Cent Sch 
Dist, 13 PERB ¶ 3058 (1980).  
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disturb the ALJ’s credibility resolutions.  Credibility determinations by an ALJ are 
generally entitled to great weight unless there is objective evidence in the record 
compelling a conclusion that the credibility finding is manifestly incorrect.16  The UFT 
has not provided any objective evidence that establishes that the ALJ manifestly erred 
here, and our examination of the record reveals no such evidence. 
The credited testimony shows that not all of the RIOT procedures were new or 
needed to be performed for each student and, further, that speech teachers were able 
to reduce the amount of time they spent performing other tasks in order to perform the 
new requirements imposed by RIOT.  In this respect, we affirm the ALJ’s finding that 
Bornemann’s testimony was not sufficient to demonstrate speech teachers’ practices 
pursuant to RIOT throughout the District or to demonstrate the specific amount of time 
that performing each new task imposed by RIOT took, because the ALJ also credited 
Manning’s testimony that other teachers already performed some of these tasks and 
that not all of the RIOT procedures needed to be completed for each student on a 
speech teacher’s caseload.   
In sum, we find that the ALJ did not err in finding that the record evidence does 
not support a finding either that speech teachers were required to accomplish 
                                            
16 Bellmore-Merrick Cent Sch Dist, 48 PERB ¶ 3022, 3077 (2015) (quoting UFT (Cruz), 
48 PERB ¶ 3004 (2015)); see also Catskill Housing Auth, 49 PERB ¶ 3025, 3081 
(2016);  County of Clinton, 47 PERB ¶ 3026, 3079 (2014) and Manhasset Union Free 
Sch Dist, 41 PERB ¶ 3005, at 3019 (2008); citing County of Tioga, 44 PERB ¶ 3016, 
3062 (2011); Mount Morris Cent Sch Dist, 41 PERB ¶ 3020 (2008); City of Rochester, 
23 PERB ¶ 3049 (1990); Hempstead Housing Auth, 12 PERB ¶ 3054 (1979); Captain's 
Endowment Assn, 10 PERB ¶ 3034 (1977); see also County of Ulster, 39 PERB ¶ 3013, 
at 3045-3046 (citing Fashion Institute of Technology v Helsby, 44 AD2d 550, 7 PERB    
¶ 7005, 7009 (1st Dept 1974)). 
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significantly more work in the course of a workday or that speech teachers’ 
workdays/scheduled hours of work had been lengthened.17  In the absence of such a 
finding, there is no basis to conclude that the District’s implementation of the new 
standards of practice violated § 209-a.1 (d) of the Act.18   
Finally, the UFT argues that, if necessary to sustain the charge, PERB should 
adopt a new standard to analyze alleged workload improper workload charges.  We 
decline to do so.  Our current standard makes an increase in workload mandatorily 
negotiable only when bargaining-unit members are required to accomplish significantly 
more work in the course of a workday, but not where additional work may be distributed 
over a longer time frame, with no change in the amount or scope of work required on a 
day-to-day basis.19  We find that this approach strikes an equitable balance between an 
employer’s interest in fulfilling its mission and employees’ interest in their terms and 
conditions of employment and effectuates the purposes of the Act. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District forthwith: 
1. Negotiate with the UFT the impact upon the speech teachers of the unilateral 
implementation of the Speech and Language Standards of Practice; and  
 
                                            
17 Capital Region BOCES, 36 PERB ¶ 3004, at 3012-3013.  
18 We note that, because a contract was in effect at the time the District implemented 
the new standards of practice and because the number of hours that speech teachers 
are required to work each week is contractually defined, the allegation that the District 
increased employees’ workday or scheduled hours of work arguably should have been 
conditionally dismissed and deferred to the grievance-arbitration provisions of the 
parties’ agreement, pursuant to Herkimer County BOCES.  20 PERB ¶ 3050 (1987).  
See Joint Exhibit 1, Article 22, for the parties’ agreed-upon dispute resolution 
mechanism.  
19 New Rochelle Housing Auth, 21 PERB ¶ 3054, at 3116.   




2. Sign and post the attached notice in all physical and electronic locations 
normally used to communicate with unit employees.   
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THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
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and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
 
 
we hereby notify all employees of the Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of New York (District), in the unit represented by the United 
Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (UFT), that the District will  
 
 
forthwith negotiate with the UFT the impact upon the speech and 
language teachers of the unilateral implementation of the Speech 
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Respondent 
 
 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
  This case comes to us on exceptions by the State of New York (Department of 
Corrections and Community Supervision-Albion Correctional Facility) (State or DOCCS) 
to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the State violated § 209-
a.1 (d) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act).1  The ALJ found that the 
State violated its duty to negotiate in good faith when it refused to provide the New York 
State Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (NYSCOPBA) a 
copy of a videotape capturing the alleged misconduct of a member whose disciplinary 
grievance was pending, but prior to the filing of a demand for arbitration. 
EXCEPTIONS 
 The State excepts to the ALJ’s finding of a violation of the Act.2  More 
                                            
1 49 PERB ¶ 4536 (2016). 
2 Exception No 1. 
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specifically, the State excepts to the ALJ’s finding that the decision of the Appellate 
Division, Third Department in Pfau v. New York State Public Employment Relations 
Board, 69 AD3d 1080, 43 PERB ¶ 7001 (3d Dept 2010) and its progeny, were not 
dispositive of the issues in this matter.3  The State further contends that the ALJ erred 
by declining to find compliance with the Act in that the State’s long-standing practice in 
similar cases was to produce a copy of a surveillance tape only after the filing of a 
demand for arbitration.4  Additionally, the State argues that the ALJ erred in finding that 
it was required to provide the videotape to NYSCOPBA despite the lack of an express 
requirement that it do so under the disciplinary provisions contained within the parties’ 
negotiated collective bargaining agreement.5  The State asserts that the ALJ erred in 
not finding the requested disclosure to be unduly burdensome.  The State also argues 
that “the Taylor Law contains no enabling statute language that requires the disclosure 
of the video demanded.”6  Finally, the State excepts to the ALJ’s finding that the dispute 
was not moot. 
 NYSCOPBA filed a response supporting the ALJ’s decision. 
 For the reasons stated below, we affirm the ALJ’s decision in part but vacate her 
conclusion finding a violation of the Act. 
FACTS 
 At all relevant times, the parties were governed by a collective bargaining 
agreement (Agreement).  Section 7.1 of the Agreement states that “[f]or the purposes of 
this Agreement, all disputes shall be subject to the grievance procedure as outlined 
                                            
3 Exception Nos 2, 5. 
4 Exception No 3. 
5 Exception No 4 
6 Exception No 6. 
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below.”7  Two distinct procedures are relevant here.  First, the Agreement provides that 
a “dispute concerning the application and/or interpretation of this Agreement, which is 
subject to all steps of the grievance procedure including arbitration, except those 
provisions which are specifically excluded.”8  Second, the Agreement provides that “[a] 
claim of improper or unjust discipline against an employee shall be processed in 
accordance with Article 8 of this Agreement.”9   
 Article 8 of the Agreement begins by stating that: 
Discipline shall be imposed upon employees otherwise 
subject to the provisions of Sections 75 and 76 of the Civil 
Service Law only pursuant to this Article, and the procedure 
and remedies herein shall apply in lieu of the procedure and 
remedies prescribed by such sections of the Civil Service 
Law which shall not apply to employees.10  
 
 Under Article 8, a notice of discipline detailing the alleged offense and proposed 
penalty must be served upon the employee, the appropriate Union grievance 
representative, and the president of NYSCOPBA.11  The penalty proposed may not be 
implemented unless the employee “(1) fails to file a disciplinary grievance within 14 
days of service of the notice of discipline; (2) having filed a grievance, fails to file a 
timely appeal to disciplinary arbitration, or (3) having appealed to disciplinary arbitration, 
until and to the extent that it is upheld by the arbitrator, or (4) the matter is settled.”12   
 Article 8 expressly states that the “notice of discipline may be the subject of a 
disciplinary grievance,” and provides for pre-arbitration efforts to meet in order to settle 
                                            
7 Jt Ex 3, § 7.1. 
8 Id, §7.1(a). 
9 Id, §7.1(c). 
10 Ans, Ex A, § 8.1. 
11 Ans, Ex A, § 8.2(a) & (b). 
12 Ans, Ex 4 § 8.2 (c).   
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the grievance, with the employer required to give its final position in writing.13  If the 
“disciplinary grievance is not settled or otherwise resolved, it may be appealed to 
disciplinary arbitration,” which is governed by an agreement between the parties and the 
Public Employment Relations Board.14  While the arbitrator’s determinations as to guilt 
or innocence and the appropriateness of proposed penalties, “[d]isciplinary arbitrators 
shall neither add to, subtract from, nor modify the provisions of this Agreement.”15 
 Article 8 of the Agreement further provides a right for an employee to union 
representation “at a disciplinary meeting or arbitration by a chief sector steward or 
designee.”16  Union representatives shall not suffer loss of earnings or be required to 
charge leave credits “as a result of processing or investigating disciplinary grievances” 
during work hours.  Rather, “[r]easonable and necessary time processing and 
investigating grievances” shall be considered time worked, as long as it falls within the 
representative’s normal working hours.17  
 On November 10, 2014, DOCCS served a correction officer at Albion 
Correctional Facility with a Notice of Discipline claiming that the officer “used 
unnecessary physical force against an inmate” and “failed to report a use of physical 
force against an inmate,” seeking a penalty of 60 days’ suspension without pay.18  On  
November 14, 2014, NYSCOPBA timely filed a disciplinary grievance in accordance 
with Article 8.2 (d) of the Agreement seeking dismissal of the charges alleged and the 
                                            
13 Ans, Ex 4 § 8.2 (d).   
14 Ans, Ex 4 § 8.2 (e) & (f).   
15 Ans, Ex 4 § 8.2 (h).   
16 Ans, Ex 4 § 8.5. 
17 Id. 
18 Jt Ex 4. 
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penalty sought in the Notice of Discipline.19 
 On or about December 8, 2014, NYSCOPBA Business Agent Joe Miano spoke 
to DOCCS Labor Relations Representative David Gallagher via telephone regarding the 
disciplinary grievance.  In that conversation, the parties discussed potential settlement 
of the grievance, and Miano requested a copy of the video recording of the alleged 
incident that gave rise to the November 10, 2014 Notice of Discipline.  Miano testified 
that, prior to going to arbitration, NYSCOPBA investigates as much as possible to 
attempt resolution of a grievance without arbitration.20    
 In a December 18, 2014 email, Miano again requested a copy of the video 
recording of the alleged incident that gave rise to the Notice of Discipline and the 
grievance.  In the email, Miano stated that the “video is needed for preparation for an 
agency level hearing.”21   
 Labor Relations Representative David Gallagher replied to Miano in an email the 
next day, stating that DOCCS Director of Labor Relations, John Shipley, had directed 
that “we will release a copy of the video to the attorney of record, should the case reach 
that point.”22   
 On or about December 22, 2014, NYSCOBA Counsel, William Golderman, 
telephoned Shipley, reiterating the prior requests for a copy of the video.  According to 
Golderman’s testimony, Shipley again denied the request for a copy of the video at that 
time, but said that it would be made available if the grievance was appealed and an 
                                            
19 DOCCS objected to the mischaracterization of this item in the improper practice 
charge as a “contract grievance.”  Both parties thereafter agreed that it was a 
“disciplinary grievance.” See ALJ Ex 6, 9.  
20 Tr, at pp 20-21.   
21 Jt Ex 2. 
22 Id. 
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attorney appointed to take the matter to arbitration.  Golderman testified that Shipley 
never informed him that anyone would be permitted to view the video in person.23  
Miano testified that it was not until April of 2015, that he was informed that he could 
come to the facility to review the video.24  Miano noted that viewing a video with the 
grievant was helpful because he could ask the individual what he was doing and why he 
was doing it, which allowed Miano to determine whether NYSCOBA should settle the 
matter or go to arbitration.25   
 Shipley testified that he had told Golderman that there was “[n]o right to 
discovery,” but that the union could make an appointment to view the video, and, 
further, that he had instructed Gallagher to convey to Miano that DOCCS “would not 
disseminate a copy of the video to him, that if he wanted to make an appointment to 
come to Labor Relations and review the video, we would do that.”26  According to 
Shipley, videos relevant to grievances have been viewed by NYSCOPBA attorneys and 
labor representatives at the offices of DOCCS Office of Labor Relations since at least 
2002.27 
 Shipley testified that DOCCS’s position with respect to releasing the video was 
based on security and patient privacy concerns.28  In particular, he testified that the 
video showed entrances and exits into secure areas of the facility,29 locking 
mechanisms on the secure doors,30 and areas that were not visible in surveillance 
                                            
23 Tr, at pp 118-119.  
24 Tr, at pp 22-23.   
25 Tr, at p 27.  
26 Tr, at pp 54; 48. 
27 Tr, at p 53.  
28 Tr, at p 51.  
29 Tr, at p 52. 
30 Id. 
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footage.31  Further, because the at-issue area of the facility housed inmates being 
treated for mental health disorders Shipley was concerned about violating the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Mental Hygiene Law by 
identifying an inmate receiving treatment.32  Assistant Commissioner James O’Gorman 
corroborated Shipley’s security concerns.33      
 DOCCS submitted, in rebutting a proposed factual finding of the ALJ, that it “has 
provided DVD copies of video recordings to attorneys representing Charging Party’s 
members in disciplinary arbitrations subsequent to a demand for arbitration in advance 
of such proceeding.”34  In the same letter, DOCCS stated that, after its receipt of the  
January 29, 2015 notice of appeal to disciplinary arbitration in the underlying matter 
“DOCCS was then willing to provide a copy of the video to Charging Party’s 
attorneys.”35   
 On May 12, 2015, the parties fully settled the disciplinary proceeding. 
DISCUSSION 
 The State argues that the ALJ erred in not dismissing the charge as moot upon 
being informed that the video at issue was provided to counsel for NYSCOPBA after it 
filed the demand for arbitration.  The Board has “long held that where the issues raised 
by improper practice charges are academic, we do not consider that the policies of the 
Act would be served by our consideration of the charges.”36  And, as we have 
previously stated, the production of information requested in order to process a 
                                            
31 Tr, at 62. 
32 Tr, at pp 52, 69, 71.  
33 Tr, at pp 96-98.  
34 ALJ Ex 9.  
35 These facts were corroborated by testimony.  Tr, at pp 23-25.  
36 State of New York (OTDA), 50 PERB ¶ 3009, 3042 (2017). 
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grievance and prepare for a hearing or an arbitration, would, in normal circumstances, 
most likely render the charge moot.37   
 However, the issue here, whether the refusal to provide requested information in 
the generally abbreviated time period between the service of disciplinary charges and  
service of the notice of appeal to disciplinary arbitration, falls “under the exception to the 
mootness doctrine applicable to matters of public importance capable of repetition yet 
evading review.”38   Accordingly, under the facts and the procedural posture here, the 
policies of the Act are best served by addressing the substantive issues of law raised by 
the exceptions.39 
 The State contends that “neither sections 209-a.1 (a) and (d), nor any other 
section of the Act, expressly obligate a public employer to furnish any information to an 
employee organization, in disciplinary proceedings or otherwise.”40  The State then 
asserts that “PERB cannot create rights not contemplated by the statute.”41   
 However, the very decision relied upon by the State in making this sweeping 
statement, Pfau v NYS Public Employment Relations Board, found that the right of a 
public employee organization, upon request, to information normally maintained in the 
regular course of business is contemplated by the Act; the Pfau Court, reaffirming 
                                            
37 Id. 
38 City of New York, 50 PERB ¶ 6501, n. 8 (2017), citing City of New York v NYS Pub 
Empl Relations Bd, 54 AD3d 480, 41 PERB ¶7004 (3d Dept 2008), lv denied, 12 NY3d 
701 (2009). 
39 Id.  We note that exception number 1 does not raise any specific claim of error, but 
appears to be a boilerplate exception to the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion.  This exception, 
to the extent that it seeks to raise any claim not asserted in the remaining exceptions 
numbered 2 through 7, is denied as deficient pursuant to 213.2(b) of PERB’s Rules of 
Procedure.  See generally UFT (Leon), 48 PERB ¶ 3016 (2015); UFT (Pinkard), 44 
PERB ¶ 3011 (2011).       
40 Br in Support of Exceptions, at 22.   
41 Id at 23 (quoting Pfau v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 69 AD3d 1080, 1081, 43 PERB 
¶ 7001 (3d Dept 2010)).   
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several of its own precedents, expressly held that: 
Civil Service Law § 209–a.1, together with Civil Service Law 
§§ 202 and 203, provide firm footing for the recognized right 
of an employee organization to obtain information relevant to 
a potential contractual grievance about the interpretation, 
application or alleged violation of a provision of a collective 
bargaining agreement.42 
 
 Indeed, Pfau has been cited for this very proposition.43  We are unaware of any 
decision holding to the contrary, and the State has cited none.44   
 The statutory language relied on by the Pfau Court to find a “firm footing” for the 
right to request and receive information expressly provides for the right to “form, join, 
and participate in . . . employee organizations of their own choosing,” and, with even 
more obvious salience here, “the right to be represented by employee organizations, to 
negotiate collectively with their public employers in the determination of their terms and 
conditions of employment, and the administration of grievances arising thereunder.45  
The Board has long held that these provisions contemplate effective representation, 
                                            
42 69 AD3d at 1081-1082, following Hampton Bays Union Free Sch Dist v Pub Empl 
Relations Bd, 62 AD3d 1066, 1068 (3d Dept 2009)), lv denied, 13 NY3d 711 (2009); 
CSEA v New York State Pub Empl Relations Bd, 46 AD3d 1037, 1037-1038, 40 PERB 
¶ 7009 (3d Dept 2007); County of Erie, 14 AD3d 14, 17-18 (3d Dept 2004).  See, eg, 
County of Erie and Erie County Medical Center Corp (New York State Nurses Assn), 45 
PERB ¶ 3036 (2012); City of Rochester, 29 PERB ¶ 3070 (1996); Hornell Cent Sch Dist, 
9 PERB ¶ 3032 (1976).   
43 Lefevbre v Morgan, ___ F Supp3d ___, 2017 WL 564090 at n. 8 (SDNY Feb 2, 2017). 
44 Indeed, enforcing the similar statutory requirement in § 12–306(c)(4) of the New York 
City Collective Bargaining Law (12 NYCRR ch 3) (NYCCBL) while overturning over 40 
years of Board holdings which the NYCCBL effectively codifies would provide New York 
City employee organizations more substantive and procedural rights than state 
employee organizations, drawing into question whether the NYCCBL conforms to the 
requirement that it “be ‘substantially equivalent’ to the ‘provisions and procedures’ of the 
Taylor Law itself.”  Mayor of the City of New York v Council of the City of New York, 7 
NY3d, 40 PERB ¶ 7524 (2007) (quoting Civil Service Law § 212(1), (2)).  The State has 
provided no persuasive reasoning for so unprecedented and draconian a reading of the 
Act. 
45 Act, §§ 202, 203 (emphasis added). 
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which in turn requires access to appropriate information in the possession, custody and 
control of public employers.46     
 Moreover, we find it instructive that our decisions finding a duty to provide 
requested information within the statutory duty to negotiate in good faith and a breach of 
that duty as violative of § 209-a.1 (a) and (d), are broadly consistent with those of the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the federal courts finding similar obligations 
under the duty to “bargain collectively” and “in good faith” prescribed by the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).47  Under the NLRA, as under the Act, “[t]here can be no 
question of the general obligation of an employer to provide information that is needed 
by the bargaining representative for the proper performance of its duties.  Similarly, the 
duty to bargain unquestionably extends beyond the period of contract negotiations and 
applies to labor-management relations during the term of an agreement.”48  Thus, we 
reject the State’s argument that the Act does not provide a “firm footing” for the right to 
request and obtain information not just for collective bargaining purposes, but for 
purposes of contract administration.   
 The Pfau decision does hold, however, that “in light of, among other things, the 
                                            
46 See generally Board of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of Albany, 6 PERB          
¶ 3012 (1973); Salmon River Cent Sch Dist, 21 PERB ¶ 3006 (1988); City of Rochester, 
29 PERB ¶ 3070 (1996); Board of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York, 40 
PERB ¶ 3002 (2007) (unions entitled to information in aid of negotiations and 
administration of grievances).   
47 29 USC §§ 158(a) (1), (2), and (5) & (d).  We note that § 209-a (6) of the Act provides 
that “no body of federal or state law applicable wholly or in part to private employment, 
shall be regarded as binding or controlling precedent,” and that we do not consider 
ourselves bound by these decisions, but cite them as demonstrating the reasoned 
approach of our construction of the same terms.       
48 NLRB v Acme Industrial Co, 385 US 432, 435-436 (1967), citing NLRB v Truitt Mfg 
Co, 351 US 149, 152-153 (1956); see also American Baptist Homes, Inc v NLRB, 858 
F.3d 612, 613 (DC Cir. 2017); SDBC Holdings, Inc. v NLRB, 711 F.3d 281, 287-288 (2d 
Cir 2013); NLRB v Dover Hospital Services, Inc., 636 Fed.Appx. 826 (2d Cir 2016); see 
City of Albany, 6 PERB ¶ 3012, 3030-3031 (1973). 
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starkly disparate roles of contractual grievances and employer disciplinary proceedings, 
it was arbitrary to import the established right to information in contractual grievances 
into employee disciplinary proceedings,” noting that the collective bargaining agreement 
between the parties in that matter did not expressly import a right to receive 
information.49  Relying on this holding, the State contends that we should treat the 
“disciplinary proceedings” at issue here as distinct from contract grievances, and find 
that the collective bargaining agreement’s lack of an express right to receive information 
precludes applying the right to request and receive information under the Act.  In 
support of this claim, the State points to the fact that the Agreement has separate 
articles addressing “Grievance and Arbitration” (Article 7) and “Discipline” (Article 8).50   
 As a threshold matter, “[i]t is well settled that a contract provision in a collective 
bargaining agreement may modify, supplement, or replace the more traditional forms of 
protection afforded public employees,” specifically, “those in sections 75 and 76 of the 
Civil Service Law which delineate procedures and remedies available to employees to 
challenge disciplinary action taken or proposed to be taken against them by their 
employers.”51  Article 8 of the Agreement explicitly does this, stating that the “procedure 
and remedies herein shall apply in lieu of the procedure and remedies prescribed by 
such sections of the Civil Service Law which shall not apply to employees.” 52  In other 
words, the contractual grievance and arbitration procedures relating to discipline wholly 
                                            
49 69 AD3d at 1083. 
50 Jt Ex 3; ALJ Ex 3, Ans, Ex A. 
51 Dye v NYC Transit Auth, 88 AD2d 899, 899 (2d Dept); Johnson City Professional 
Firefighters Assn v Village of Johnson City, 75 AD3d 805, 806 (3d Dept 2010) (under 
Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76, “statutory power may be modified or superseded 
through collective bargaining or negotiation”); Transport Workers Union of Greater NY v 
Bianco, 130 AD3d 507, 507 (1st Dept 2015) (quoting Patel v New York City Hous Auth, 
26 AD3d 172, 174 (1st Dept 2006)).   
52 Ans, Ex A, § 8.1. 
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displace the statutory procedures and remedies under Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76.   
 Section 203 of the Act, which provides for the right to union representation in 
negotiating collective bargaining agreements “and the administration of grievances 
arising thereunder,” does not distinguish between grievances arising out of disputes 
over benefits, over other unit-wide terms and conditions, or over discipline.  The right 
applies to grievances, writ large.  In the context of negotiated disciplinary grievance 
procedures lacking explicit disclosure provisions, the Board has long held, and the 
courts have affirmed, that “[t]he failure to provide an employee organization with 
information relevant and material to the investigation or prosecution of a potential 
grievance constitutes an improper practice.”53  The State contends that our following our 
long standing precedent conflicts with the decision in Pfau.   
 We have previously found that Pfau does not apply where a union “seeks 
documents and information to evaluate a pending contract grievance concerning 
discipline and to enable it to provide representation to the at-issue unit member at 
arbitration pursuant to the negotiated terms of the parties' agreement.”54  Our 
                                            
53 See, eg, Hamptons Bay Union Free Sch Dist, 62 AD3d, at 1067-1068 (finding 
improper practice where employer refused to furnish documentation underlying its 
termination of a probationary physical education teacher before her probationary period 
expired, and collective bargaining agreement allowed teacher to grieve termination on 
grounds that it was “capriciously, arbitrarily or discriminatorily”); CSEA, 46 AD3d, at 
1038 (upholding Board finding an improper practice where State refused to provide 
information in context of contractual disciplinary arbitration where State was seeking to 
terminate employees for misconduct); County of Erie v State, 14 AD3d 14 (2004) 
(upholding Board finding that employer committed improper practice in failing to turn 
over to union files pertaining to discharged employee’s grievance for union's use in its 
own investigation of grievance, inasmuch as requested materials were not otherwise 
available to union).    
We note that the State’s efforts to distinguish these cases, by selective quotation 
and by not addressing the actual holdings of the Third Department, or the Board’s 
decisions confirmed by the Court, are entirely lacking in merit. 
54 County of Montgomery, 44 PERB ¶ 3045, 3135 (2011). 
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confidence in this distinction of Pfau from the instant case is strengthened by the Court 
of Appeals’s recent drawing of what is essentially the same distinction in City of New 
York v New York State Nurses’s Association.55  There, the Court held that, “by defining 
‘grievance’ to include disciplinary action, the CBA, has, as a matter of contract, 
incorporated as to disciplinary actions the information requirements applicable to 
grievances.”56   
 Unlike Pfau, but exactly parallel to the City of New York case, the Agreement 
here covers both interpretative and disciplinary grievances.  Article 7, titled “Grievance 
and Arbitration,”  creates two separate grievance procedures, one (contained within 
Article 7) for interpretative grievances and the other (provided for in Article 7, but set 
forth in Article 8), for disciplinary grievances.  Both are expressly comprised of a 
“grievance” and an “arbitration” phase.  Moreover, Article 8 repeatedly and expressly 
refers to the pre-arbitration proceedings as a “disciplinary grievance” or just a 
“grievance.”57  Here, as in City of New York, the parties have negotiated a contractual 
grievance procedure for disciplinary matters.  The duty to negotiate in good faith, which 
extends to contract administration and to investigation and processing of grievances, 
                                            
55 ___ NY3d ___, 2017 WL 2466673 (June 8, 2017). 
56 Id.  
57 For example, Ans, Ex A, §§ 8.2(b)(c), (d), (e), 8.3 (“a disciplinary grievance may be 
settled at any time…”), 8.4 (Prior to. . . the exhaustion of the disciplinary grievance 
procedure provided for in this Article”), 8.5 (employee’s right to be “represented at a 
disciplinary grievance meeting or arbitration”, representatives to be paid for 
“[r]easonable and necessary time for processing and investigating grievances…”).  
therefore applies.58   
 Indeed, the Agreement expressly recognizes the applicability of this duty, by 
expressly providing for union representation in disciplinary matters and by 
acknowledging that such representation extends to “processing and investigating 
grievances” by union representatives, who need not charge leave or forfeit pay for such 
processing and investigation of grievances during scheduled work hours.59  
Thus, this case falls under the rubric of City of New York, not Pfau. 
 Having disposed of the more global issues posed by the exceptions, we turn now 
to the more case-specific ones.  In the instant case, the State contends that the ALJ 
erred in not considering what the State contends is its long-term practice of allowing for 
union representatives and the grievant to view videos of incidents forming the basis of 
charges at DOCCS’s Office of Labor Relations, and of providing copies of the footage 
upon the receipt of a demand for arbitration.  The State further contends that the ALJ 
erred by not giving sufficient weight to the specific security and privacy concerns it 
advanced, arguing that the ALJ impermissibly dismissed these concerns on the ground 
that DOCCS was willing to produce the video to the assigned attorney after the filing of 
a demand for arbitration.  DOCCS defended this distinction on the ground that 
production of sensitive material “is more reasonably handled when turned over to the 
                                            
58 Again, as we noted in rejecting the State’s challenge to the right to receive 
information as inherent in the duty to negotiate in good faith, we further note that the 
NLRB has long found that duty applies to disciplinary grievances such as that here, 
which has been upheld by the federal courts.  See, eg, Chesapeake and Potomac 
Telephone Co v NLRB, 687 F2d 633, 636-637 (2d Cir 1982) (“disclosure of the type of 
discipline, if any, imposed by C&P upon employees in the past for exhibiting an 
improper attitude toward customers could lead to withdrawal of the Union's arbitration 
demand or settlement by C&P, depending on whether C&P's practice was consistent 
with the discipline imposed here”). 
59 Ans Ex A, § 8.5. 
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control of an attorney who is an officer of the court.”60 
 As to the specific contours of the right to receive information on request under 
the Act, we have recently reaffirmed: 
For close to four decades, we have held that under the Act 
an employee organization has a general right to receive 
documents and information requested from an employer for 
use by the employee organization in the administration of a 
collectively negotiated agreement including processing a 
grievance and preparing for a grievance hearing and/or 
arbitration. Failure of an employer to produce requested 
information and documents may constitute a violation of both 
§§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Act.61 
 
In State of New York (OTDA), we also explained: 
That duty includes an obligation on the part of the employer 
to provide information relevant to a union's investigation of 
the merits of a grievance.  Moreover, an employee 
organization is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to 
examine requested information and documents before 
determining whether to continue to process a grievance, and 
the right to receive information and documents extends after 
a grievance has been processed to arbitration.62 
 
 However, the right is not without limitations.  We have long held that:  
the general right to receive requested documents and 
information is subject to three primary limitations: 
reasonableness, which includes the burden on the 
responding party; relevancy; and necessity. This duty may, 
where appropriate, prevail over confidentiality rights under 
statutes other than the Act.  In such cases, we have further 
held that prior to refusing to disclose information under the 
Act based upon a claim of confidentiality, a respondent is 
                                            
60 Brief in Support of Exceptions at 30. 
61 State of New York, 50 PERB ¶ 3009, at 3043, quoting County of Montgomery, 44 
PERB ¶ 3045, at 3134, citing, inter alia, Board of Educ, City Sch Dist of the City of 
Albany, 6 PERB ¶ 3012 (1973); Hornell Cent Sch Dist, 9 PERB ¶ 3032 (1976); City of 
Rochester, 29 PERB ¶ 3070 (1996). 
62 Id, at 3043-3044 (footnotes and quotation marks omitted; citing and quoting County of 
Erie v State, 14 AD3d 14, 37 PERB ¶ 7007, 7015 (3d Dept 2004)); Matter of Schuyler-
Chemung-Tioga BOCES, 34 PERB ¶ 3019 (2001); State of New York (Department of 
Health & Roswell Mem Inst), 26 PERB ¶ 3072 (1993). 
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obligated to first engage in good faith negotiations for the 
purpose of reaching an agreed-upon accommodation 
concerning the requested information.63 
 
Here, the record is insufficiently complete for us to apply these factors.  
  As a threshold matter, because the ALJ did not make a credibility finding 
between the starkly contrasting accounts of Shipley on the one hand and Golderman 
and Miano on the other, we are unable to determine whether or not an offer was in fact 
made to allow a NYSCOPBA representative and the grievant to view the video at the 
DOCCS Office of Labor Relations.  While we do not hold that such an offer would 
necessarily have satisfied the duty in this case, let alone in every case, we do agree 
that a more nuanced balancing of the interests asserted by the parties was warranted 
here than is reflected in the ALJ’s opinion.64  We reiterate that the test is a standard, 
inquiring what is reasonable under the circumstances under the specific factual context 
presented by each individual case, and that no “bright line rule” dictates every 
outcome.65  We note in particular that, to the extent that DOCCS’s action was 
predicated on Shipley’s understanding that there was no duty under the Act to produce 
the video, based on his understanding of Pfau, it was without foundation. 
                                            
63 Id, at 3044 (footnotes and quotation marks removed; citing and quoting Utica City 
School Dist, 48 PERB ¶ 3008 (2015); citing Hampton Bays Union Free Sch Dist, 41 
PERB ¶ 3008, 3051 (2008), confirmed sub nom. Hampton Bays Union Free Sch Dist v 
Pub Empl Relations Bd, 62 AD3d 1066 (3d Dept 2009)), lv denied, 13 NY3d 711 (2009); 
Bd of Ed, City Sch Dist of the City of Albany, 6 PERB ¶ 3012 (1973); State of New York 
(OMRDD), 38 PERB ¶ 3036 (2005), confirmed sub nom. CSEA v New York State Pub 
Empl Relations Bd, 14 Misc3d 199, 39 PERB ¶ 7009 (2006), affd, 46 AD3d 1037, 40 
PERB ¶ 7009 (3d Dept 2007); County of Erie, 45 PERB ¶ 3036 (2012)). 
64 We note that in Greenburgh No 11 Union Free Sch Dist (Greenburgh No 11 Fedn of 
Teachers), 33 PERB ¶ 3059 (2000), the Board held that a union is entitled to 
appropriate information at all stages of a contractual grievance procedure, both before 
and including arbitration. 
65 See Adam I. Muchmore, “Jurisdictional Standards (And Rules),” 46 Vand. J. 
Transnat'l L. 171, 176-183 (2013) (explaining distinction); HLA Hart, The Concept of 
Law 128-30 (Oxford Press 1961) (same).  
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  Normally, in such circumstances, we would remand the matter for such a 
credibility determination and weighing of the applicable factors.  However, multiple 
reasons militate against such a remand here.  The remand would, in this case, have to 
be to a different ALJ as the ALJ who decided the case below is no longer with the 
Agency.  The parties would thus be put to the inconvenience of a second hearing before 
a new ALJ, and this matter would expend their and the Agency’s resources years after 
the production of the video at issue. 
 More to the point, the video having been produced, and the underlying grievance 
settled, we have entertained the State’s exceptions not because of a live controversy 
between the parties, but because the State’s contention that no duty to respond to pre-
arbitration information requests was susceptible of repetition yet evading review.66  
Having authoritatively rejected that argument, as well as the State’s more global 
arguments that no such right can be found in the Act, and that any such right does not, 
in any event apply to the parties’ negotiated disciplinary grievance and arbitration 
provisions, we do not believe that the policies of the Act would be well served by a 
purely academic remand.  
 Accordingly, as the ALJ’s decision cannot be sustained on the record before us, 
and the underlying matters are moot, we vacate the ALJ’s decision. 
DATED:  August 31, 2017 
               Albany, New York 
       
                                            
66 City of New York, 50 PERB ¶ 6501, at n. 8. 
